

A SEMASIOLOGICAL HISTORY OF HIGH GERMAN in(t)-, en(t)-;
WITH A GENERAL THEORY OF CHANGE OF MEANING

Approved:

Klassen Boypen
W. B. Hollander
Morgan Callaway, Jr.

Approved:

Dean of the Graduate School.

A SEMASIOLOGICAL HISTORY OF HIGH GERMAN in(t)-, en(t)-;

WITH A GENERAL THEORY OF CHANGE OF MEANING

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas in Partial Fulfill-
ment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

Meredith Knox Gardner, B.A.

(Austin, Texas)

Austin, Texas

June, 1935

Preface

The present work is the fruit of two years' research in semasiology. As a preparation for the particular problem, and indeed, before that problem had been chosen, the study was made which resulted in part one of the thesis. Such a study was necessary in order to determine which of the existing "systems" of semantics could be adopted. When I found Stern's Meaning and Change of Meaning, my problem became simplified. Here was a man through whose eyes I could survey the field. The study took its departure from him, although my ultimate systematization displayed striking changes from his.

Shortly after the selection of the prefix ent as a subject for the particular research, at the suggestion of Dr. J. L. Boysen, it became apparent that the problem was a worthy one, by reason of the variety of meanings which the prefix has had and the disagreement among authorities concerning the causes of some of the developments. The thesis attempts to explain each change of meaning of the prefix in the most probable way. Among its original contributions are the departure from the meaning Opposition, traces of which surely remain in Gothic and probably in High German, and the analysis of the original meaning of some of the compounds.

While fully conscious of the defects of the thesis--of all of them, I dare say--I am not ashamed of the work as a whole; I consider it a decent contribution to philology. I intend to do whatever is possible to efface its defects in future work, which may correct, complete, and clarify. With respect to the clarity, I hope to remove the possible reproach that I have written too much in the spirit of the strophe:

Odi profanum volgus et arceo.
Favete linguis: carmina non prius
Audita Musarum sacerdos
Virginibus puerisque canto.

This thesis, of course, owes heavily to all my teachers in every field. First is Dr. Johannes Lassen Boysen, who has been my teacher in German, Gothic, and Germanic philology. He has patiently watched and helped my study. His scholarship and his own unimpaired originality of thought have made association with him a delight.

Nor can I neglect the others: Dr. Lee M. Hollander, the first to teach me German, from whom also I had Middle High German and that splendid course in German literature; Dr. Morgan Callaway, Jr., who taught me the history of English and Middle English; Miss Lilia M. Casis, another who gives meaning to the name of teacher; Mr. Ernest J. Villavaso; Dr. Harry J. Leon, an encouraging friend since high school days; and still others. My full debt to them cannot be revealed here: it has too many sides.

The first-fruits of my scholastic life are gathered.
To the next harvest!

Meredith Knox Gardner

Austin, May 24, 1935.

Contents

Preface	iii
Contents	v
Part One: A General Theory of Change of Meaning	
I. Preliminaries.	1
II. Meaning	5
III. Causes of Change of Meaning	22
IV. A Classification by Effects	56
Part Two: A Semasiological History of High German <u>in(t)-</u> , <u>en(t)-</u>	
V. Preliminaries.	64
VI. Non-Germanic Cognates	68
VII. Germanic Cognates and High German	77
VIII. The Meanings of <u>in(t)-</u> , <u>en(t)-</u>	86
IX. Gothic and High German Examples	104
X. Conclusions	115
Bibliography	123

Note: Many of the chapters are equipped at the head with outlines.

PART ONE
A GENERAL THEORY OF CHANGE OF MEANING

CHAPTER I
Preliminaries

Outline:

1. Justification of the Inclusion of This Part.
2. Method.

1. Justification of the Inclusion of This Part.

It would be an extraordinary thesis in botany indeed which should before treating its special topic expound a general theory of botany or even of one of the more general subdivisions of that science. That semasiology, or semantics, is one of the more general subdivisions of linguistics is indubitable; and change of meaning is the larger part of semasiology as it is dealt with today. But this study proposes to make use of a science, yet first to erect tentatively the principles of that science as a working hypothesis. Can the part contain the whole? How, then, resolve this paradox?

Those principles must be erected because no one has yet erected them. Some of the mechanisms of meaning-change are beyond dispute, but no one has yet combined all the mechanisms into a unitary system, theoretically and practically

all-inclusive, and seen that system accepted by his fellow-workers as the unassailable systematic expression of the facts in the case.

Part I of this thesis is a contribution, partly eclectic, partly original, owing much especially to Gustaf Stern, whose Meaning and Change of Meaning¹ presents, with a wealth

¹ Subsequent reference to "Stern" will be to this book. Complete bibliographical details concerning all books referred to will be given in the Bibliography.

of exposition and illustration, a unitary theory of meaning and its change such as is aimed at here.²

² This essay will not touch on all subsidiary issues treated by Stern. To make this an exhaustive treatise of established principles of semasiology would swell these pages to encyclopaedic proportions; moreover, the mere task of organizing all the facts would be in itself a work of weeks. In general, this essay will give (1) enough of the main theory to enable the reader to appreciate the various classes of change-processes, and (2) points on which I disagree with Stern. Stern's book is the necessary supplement of this thesis.

2. Method.

First an attempt will be made to give the basis for the theory: a philosophy and psychology of language and meaning. The situation of meaning will be analyzed into its elements. Then causes of change of meaning will be directly taken into consideration.

Change will first be classified by cause and not by effect. That is, the various processes which result in change

will be distinguished and classified. It will later be shown that there is no simple correspondence between causes and effects. For an example of a classification of change of meaning by effects, see the article by Dr. Elise Richter, "Die Rolle der Semantik in der historischen Grammatik," in Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift, 2. Jahrgang (1910), pp. 231-243.

Causes will be classified primarily by generalized processes, and not by the occasions thereof. For example, the classification will not be primarily by cultural or geographical factors; such a classification would be of enormous and unworkable complexity, and in our present state of knowledge is impossible. However, it is necessary to study these factors, to discover just how much they affect trends, what processes are exempt from their influence, whether they explain apparent caprices in the expected operation of the processes, and how far they render semasiological changes more predictable.

A matter more closely related to the general processes and, it may be, more susceptible of systematization, is the effect of the vocabulary as a whole on change in meaning: the effect of the existence of synonyms and of gaps in the vocabulary, and the operation of semasiological perturbations in various parts of the vocabulary not immediately under consideration.

The view-point will be that of the form, as undergoing

changes of meaning, rather than of the meaning as acquiring and losing various expressions.

CHAPTER II

Meaning

Outline:

1. Questions to be Answered in This Chapter.
2. Meaning in Terms of a Psychology of Language.
 - a. A First Restriction of the Term mean.
 - b. General Psychological Terms.
 - c. Speech as Meaningful Signs.
3. Elements Important for Change of Meaning.
 - a. Significance; the Sprechlage; Motives.
 - b. Experience; Use.
 - c. Joint Contribution of Vehicles of Discourse.
 - d. Synthesis.
 - e. Sprachnot.
 - f. Ambiguity.
 - g. Economy.
 - h. Cultural Change.

1. Questions to be Answered in This Chapter.

Since this part of the present essay concerns change of meaning, it is natural to enquire whether we know what meaning is. What things is it that mean? How do they mean? To know how things mean, must we not go deeper into the fundamental nature of these vehicles of meaning? For example, we say that words mean: we ought to know what a word is, indeed, what language is.

What are the materials with which we shall deal? If our material is men, how many aspects of their speaking activity need we consider? What peculiar complexities and tendencies of language must we bear in mind? What external physical forces affect our problem?

2. Meaning in Terms of a Psychology of Language.

This section is chiefly a clarification of terms. The terms used will be defined as they occur; but terms not peculiar to semasiology are sometimes not defined, but merely italicized in the context.

a. A First Restriction of the Term mean.

There are three uses of the word mean which ought to be distinguished: We say that (1) discourse, or a part thereof, means; (2) persons mean; (3) situations mean something to some one. The third use is the one most foreign to our technical use of the word. In it, the direct object of the verb mean is a proposition (or sentence): that which is meant is implied or foreshadowed in the life of the person for whom it is meant. I shall employ technically the word signify for this use; so for meaning, significance, for to have meaning, to be significant.

The word mean may be used in this discussion as in both examples (1) and (2) above without serious ambiguity. (A person means when he intends his signs to mean.) The primary use of the word shall be of discourse, linguistic signs, or language.

It seems that there has been discussion about the nature of meaning. There is a whole book, very readable and very sensible, which treats the subject, to wit, The meaning of meaning by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. That book did

the service of providing a stable terminology (which, however, I shall not adopt as a whole), and of showing clearly how the various elements of thought and speech are related.

b. General Psychological Terms.

First some of the terms used in describing the general psychology of language ³ should be gathered together. In

³ Vocal, articulate language (and, by extension, language in general) will frequently be referred to as speech (German die Sprache), which has the advantage of being a verbal derivative. Speech furnishes the corresponding verb, speak, but for an adjective we must have recourse to linguistic.

this work, mental activities are treated materialistically, since science can treat only of occurrences in the material world. Recent investigators who have attempted to systematize the observed phenomena of "mind" on a materialistic basis have, I believe, been successful in doing so. The acceptance of their systems is justified by the law of parsimony.

For the purposes of this essay, then, man is a machine; that is, only the mechanical, material side of him, the body, will be considered. Mind must be a manifestation of the nervous system. The grosser objective manifestations find a simple form in stimuli and responses. (In the subjective account of psychology, one describes such manifestations by terms related to perception and will.) Some stimuli

cause action seeking a repetition of the stimulus concerned; objective terminology is drive. (The subjectivist speaks of emotion, pleasure and pain, liking and disliking.) To explain the conditioning of responses, we suppose the existence of some means of association. (In subjective psychology, one uses a number of terms for the result of conditioning: apperception, reason, imagination, knowledge, belief, expectation.) Persistence of the effects of stimuli probably explains memory and learning.

c. Speech as Meaningful Signs.

Why do men speak? The general answer to this question must be the same as the answer to the question, "Why do organisms behave?" Why does a bottle machine make bottles? Why does a spring rebound? They do because they are constructed so that they do. Speech brings about results pleasureable in the long run; men are so constructed that they tend to repeat or practice acts which bring about pleasureable results; therefore do men practice speech.

Yet the mechanistic explanation of speech cannot annihilate the distinction between mean and signify. To refer back to the precision of the word mean on page 3, one must be warned against any line of reasoning such as the following: Situations signify; words mean, because they are products of an intention to mean. But man is a part of nature, mechanically operating--his so-called intention is a

sort of overgrown emotional reaction. A man talking is just a situation of nature, such as the waving of the grass in the wind. Hence, speech signifies only.--It should be recalled that intention, whatever it is, is a perfectly definite difference between the grass-situation and the man-situation, and can serve as the basis of a criterion.

The following diagram will illustrate the distinction made between mean and signify:

- | | | | | |
|---|-------|----------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|
| 1. Speech: The expression, "It is going to rain," | MEANS | 'It is going to rain;' and | SIGNIFIES | that it is going to rain. |
| 2. Sub-speech: An ominous cloud | MEANS | nothing, and | SIGNIFIES | that it is going to rain. |

Further distinction will be made later in this section and in section 3.a.

For The expression etc. after "1. Speech" in the diagram above, we may substitute any sign intended to signify that it is going to rain, and we may say that that sign ⁴means 'It is going to rain.'

⁴ In this essay meanings are uniformly enclosed in single quotation marks.

Unintentional signs are not language. This should be borne in mind in dealing with the language of animals. But no distinction is here made based on degree of awareness of the effect of signs or their place in the universe. An animal with a rudimentary universe, such as a young infant, need know only a single desire, and nothing else in the

5

world as we know it, to speak, or mean.

5

Mere significances may give rise to meanings, as when a dog's bark, significant, among other things, of the presence of a dog, is made into the child's word bow-wow, meaning 'dog'. So also choo-choo 'railway engine'.

In both the word mean and the word signify, the nervous stimulation of a receptor is implied. In signification, the mental activity of this receptor is the only mental activity implied; in meaning, his mental activity is of equal importance with that of the sign-maker (speaker). But the speaker need not be aware of the receptor.

In the mental development of an infant, I think we can theoretically distinguish the following stages, in all of which the infant can mean:

- (1) The infant means, but no language has ever meant anything to the infant.
- (2) Language has meant something to the infant, but he does not know that his signs have had the same kind of effect on others.
- (3) The infant knows that his language has the same kind of effect on others that language has on him.
(This is the only stage at which words are picked up for the purposes of speech directly.)

Another important remark concerning the use of the word mean is necessary. Significance is indivisible; if it is not a complete proposition, it is nothing. Meaning, on the other hand, can be divided up into elements. The elements themselves are non-significant, and do not become significant except in combination. They may be said to be

associated with images, but not with propositions or implications.
6

6
These considerations might lead to a definition of the sentence, if it were not for the fact that probably some of the things which we have a right to call sentences signify nothing.

Signs signify but need not mean; language means but need not signify. But when language is a sign (both means and signifies), it is only then complete and adapted to its primary function.

Understanding all that precedes, one is ready to follow an analysis of meaning. Images, expectations, ideas, and the like will be included under a general term mental content. Meaning is going to have to do with mental content on the one hand and with discourse on the other. It will denote especially the property by which one passes from a piece of discourse to a mental content. The converse procedure, passing from a mental content to discourse, is to be called expression, and viewed in this light, discourse is called an expression (concrete use).
7

7
It will be quite indifferent whether meaning itself is applied to a mental content or to the relation (association) which it bears to the linguistic form. To be over-scrupulous in matters of terminology is undesirable, although not, to be sure, in the same degree as carelessness in that respect.

What is this passing from expression to mental content? The transition takes place through association. The

perception of the expression has been associated with the mental content concerned, by the conditioning of responses. For example, a person has formed the association between the perception of the word lemon and the image of a lemon, because the word has been presented in conjunction with some other stimulus (which already evoked that image) under the proper circumstances to produce conditioning. The other stimulus may have been direct perception of a real lemon, or perception of a picture of a lemon, or a word in another language already associated with the image. The speaker, being in stage (3) (see page 10), knows that lemon is a word and that it will have the same effect on others that it had on him. (This knowledge may, of course, be erroneous.) Under such circumstances he is inclined to utter the word on occasion. As soon as a person perceives his own utterance, his original image becomes not only the exprimendum, but also the meaning thereof. (That is, the speaker is one of his own listeners.)

The terminology now being clarified, it can be compared briefly with that of Ogden and Richards (in the work cited on page 6). These authors deal with a triad of elements: the symbol (word, phrase, etc.), the reference (thought), and the referent (thing in the real world). A reference refers to a referent; a symbol symbolizes a reference. Between the word and the referent there is a third "imputed" relation: the word (in this respect called a name) stands

8

for a referent.

8

These terms are second-hand, through Stern. The Ogden-Richards book was not available at the time this essay was written.

I found that in semasiological theory the referent might as a rule be ignored. The Sprechlage (see below) sometimes takes its place. The reference is my mental content; a symbol is an expression.

9

Stern finds three determinants of meaning (pages 38-45): objective reference, subjective apprehension, and traditional range. His final definition of meaning (page 45) is as follows: "The meaning of a word -- in actual speech -- is identical with those elements of the user's (speaker's or hearer's) subjective apprehension of the referent denoted by the word, which he apprehends as expressed by it." This definition is acceptable. But it employs the term referent. There is no exception to be taken to Stern's careful use of this term (pages 38-41), but using it seems to lead him into the (to me) inappropriate primary division of the classes of change. (See chapter III here; Stern, page 175.)

To recapitulate: An expression is associated with, that is, expresses, a mental content and is said to mean that mental content. The mental content is the meaning of the expression.

10

3. Elements Important for Change of Meaning.

10

By elements is meant 'facts, conditions, phenomena which contribute.'

a. Significance; the Sprechlage; Motives.

In the long discrimination of meaning and significance,

one important point was not mentioned, namely, that a meaning may be intrinsically false, false to fact or to one's interests. The notion of significance, on the other hand, is allied to that of congruence with fact, subservience to truth. If a counsellor should tell a king, "The populace is content," the meaning of his words would be the opposite of that of the words, "The populace is restless." But, granted that the circumstances are the same, the significance of the situation which underlies the words is the same in either case. And the words themselves, whether true or false, have in either case a true significance. The significance in the case of the true words is that the counsellor is trustworthy; in the case of the false words, that the counsellor is deceptive and his counsel dangerous.

Significance is a property peculiarly of situations. And significance, as a property of situations which call for speech, has a definite influence on meaning. For, supposing a series of false meanings to be belied by experience, the significance of the situation would cause eventually, by a reconditioning of response, a change in meaning whereby the new meaning would be true to fact.

I have invented a term for the speech-situation (or the possibility of future experience of the listener which should give the lie to false words): the Sprechlage (German, 'speak-lay').

Needless to say, the Sprechlage may work on the meaning

of his words for the speaker, at the same time that, or even before, it works on their meaning for the listener.

The Sprechlage may affect meaning whether falsity of the meaning intended is due to error or design. When the falsity is designed, we may speak of the effect of motives on meaning.

Notice that the effect of motives (or of other cause of insignificant meaning) is not permanent on the meaning generally or typically caused by a given Sprechlage, but on the forms (words) which were at one time used in a given Sprechlage. Thus we have a progression:

Sprechlage A' = that the populace is restless etc.

Words A = "The populace is restless."

Words B = "The populace is content."

(1) Old words A appropriate to Sprechlage A'.

(2) New words B inappropriate to Sprechlage A'.

(3) New words B appropriate to Sprechlage A'; same meaning once possessed by old words A.

In (3) we have returned to the meaning of (1). Change in the meaning typical of the situation is temporary. But the meaning of B has been changed for all time. The application of this principle will be seen in chapter III under "Inchoate Change: Quotidianation."

b. Experience; Use.

For the Sprechlage or underlying situation to have any effect upon meaning, the listener must experience the real situation. The more the experience, the richer the meaning,

the more circumstantial, and the more accurate. If the Sprechlage changes, the change must be experienced, in order that the meaning be revised. Experience is an indispensable element in the process diagrammed above.

An unused part of an experience (perception) or of an image is not part of the meaning. By use I refer to significance to the life of the individual. Insignificant (that is, vitally insignificant) details are not noticed or are forgotten. This is an important factor in the generalization of terms, and in the matter of Sprachnot, ¹¹ Ambiguity, Economy, and Cultural Change (sections e-h).

¹¹
"Use" is even more pertinent to the matter of "synthesis", section d.

c. Joint Contribution of Vehicles of Discourse.

One must distinguish between the meaning of communication as a whole (speech, discourse) and the meaning of single vehicles of communication: for example, words, gestures, ¹² tone, figures of speech. For example, a word used ironic-

¹²
Observe that the division of labor among the various words is not what is meant in this section. Obviously there is that in combinations of words which does not appear in the individual words. The individual words, by their generality, are of limited vividness, and their images must be fragments of the "real thing". Thus for king I see a "typical" king, nebulous, uninteresting; for England I see a map and flashes of country lanes and thatched cottages; but the phrase the King of England is a man with definite features and form, on a map, but with not a trace of lanes or cottages. Meaning is not the typical image (which, as Stern says, with abstracts is often quite irrelevant), nor is it a dictionary-abstraction;

but it is the total of associated images which might be called up at one time or another in context. This battalion of images may be epitomized by a "tag" (the typical or symbolic image), tied onto the series, which is called up by the word out of context, or in an abstract proposition. But the images themselves which make the meaning are infinite in number and are for the most part only potentialities.

ally (with a false referent, let us say), has not changed its meaning. "How not, since the 'referent' is different?"

Simply because the words themselves are not the sole agencies producing the meaning: the circumstance of employing irony is an important agency. The "meaning" of that circumstance, plus the literal meaning of the words employed, gives just the meaning intended. "What," the reader asks, "is the 'meaning' of irony?" The answer is simple and irrefutable, being algebra.

a = the literal meaning of the words
employed;

b = the total meaning intended;

x = the meaning of the circumstance
of employing irony.

Then, $a + x = b$,

and $x = b - a$.

Or, x might stand for the meaning of a wink, a leer, a pause, the raising of the voice, anything you please.

Thus far, the words have not changed their meaning; but they will do so as soon as the other contributory elements are neglected. For the application of this principle, see chapter III under "Inchoate Change: Evanition of One of the Vehicles or Circumstances of Expression."

d. Synthesis.

This section bears a close relation to section b, on "use". The answer to the question, "What is a single notion, a single atom of mental content?" depends upon significance and use. ¹³ In my image of the King of England (foot-

¹³ In any event, the term unity will be introduced for a relative concept, synonymous with degree of synthesis.

note 12, page 16), England had almost vanished. When I visualize the sentence The King of England is in Paris, England is not there overtly enough to be caught. But no matter what the locale, from the phrase the Queen of Zanzibar I get a typical queen (African, to be sure) and a map of Zanzibar. Their propinquity represents, I suppose, the of.

How does synthesis affect meaning? If you cannot take your image of the King of England and sort the king of it from the England of it, there has been a certain change in the mode of meaning. Then, in the loss of the assertiveness of the elements, the meaning becomes liable to a shift in focus of mental content or image. Suppose the focus in the Queen of England shifts from queenness and Englishness to hats. Then these words will no longer mean 'the king's-wife pertaining to England,' but will mean 'the lady who wears those awful hats;' eventually a queen-of-england would mean 'a lady who wears awful hats' (shift of focus from particularity to characteristics; compare martinet etc.).

e. Sprachnot.

14

A Sprachnot is a speech-need; it arises when a culture

14

There is sometimes an impropriety about newly formed English compounds which constrains one to resort to German for technical terms.

or a craft has something new to talk about, or when an ambiguity arises (see f). An inverse Sprachnot would occur when a culture or a craft lost something to talk about, or when a craft vanished altogether, or when a superfluity of synonyms came into being. The Sprachnot may be absolute, or it may be energetic, that is, arise from the exigencies of economy (see g). In the latter case, it is a need of a more wieldy expression, and is often symptomatic of a synthesis (see d).

Every language is adequate to the culture which fosters it. But as the culture grows and changes, its growing-pains are the dislocations and stretchings of the semasiological structure of the language.

Sprachnot is dependent on significance. A culture in which the distinction of mother's brother and father's brother is important will have a word for each: thus, avunculus and patruus in Latin. When the significance is lost, a word may be lost: thus only avunculus survives (French oncle etc.).

f. Ambiguity.

We can speak of tolerable ambiguities and of intolerable ambiguities. The latter indicate a Sprachnot. Chief among

them are cases in which a term special enough is lacking and a general term must be made to do duty for a special term. Thus, if for English colonists in America corn once meant 'grain', the use of corn for 'maize' was probably an ambiguity of this sort. Or the name of a species can be used for a newly discovered species. If corn meant 'wheat' to the colonists, the ambiguity may have been of this type.

The possibilities for change of meaning or remedial word-creation are obvious.

g. Economy.

The sparing of effort pleases organisms; hence they tend to spare effort. Economy is roughly proportional to unity (see foot-note 13, page 18): synthetic mental content tends to have more economical expression than analytic mental content. And economy is also directly proportional to frequency. (See George Kingsley Zipf, Relative frequency as a determinant of phonetic change, 1929, volume 40 in Harvard studies in classical philology, and Selected studies of the principle of relative frequency in language, Harvard University Press, 1932.)

e = energy

$\frac{1}{e}$ = economy

s = degree of synthesis, unity

f = frequency

$\frac{1}{e} \propto sf$

h. Cultural Change.

As new institutions, new relations, new plants, new animals, new climate, new inventions, new customs appear, the language must name them and their concomitants. The new expressions may be creative original turnings of old expressions, or they may be new combinations of expressions; they may undergo synthesis, shift of mental focus, abbreviation. In fact, the whole range of processes of semasiological creation and change is available for the adjustment of the language to the novelties. In the classification of the following chapter, these processes will be reviewed and the influence of the factors here treated realized.

CHAPTER III

Causes of Change of Meaning

Outline:

1. Broad Principles of Classification.
2. Creative Change.
 - a. Analogy.
 - i. Analogy Proper, or Stern's Correlative Analogy.
 - ii. Analogy and Permutation.
 - b. Sanctioned Accipiens; i.e., Analogy on Great Groups.
 - i. Intentional Transfer.
 - ii. The Use of Inventors' Names and Similar Phenomena.
 - iii. Specialization-Particularization; Unique Use.
 - iv. Shortening: Clipping and Omission.
 - c. Contamination by the Sphere.
 - d. Error.
 - i. The Gross Error.
 - ii. Inevitably Incomplete Induction, Individual and National; Substitution.
 - e. Phonetic Associative Interference.
3. Inchoate Change or Adequation.
 - a. Evanition of One of the Vehicles or Circumstances of Expression.
 - b. Quotidianation.
 - c. Shift of Mental Focus.
 - i. Shift Affecting a Simplex.
 - ii. Permutation: Shift Affecting a Complex.

1. Broad Principles of Classification.

In this classification of causes of change of meaning, little attention will be given to pure creation of expressions (not Neuwendung of expressions already possessing a proper meaning). If coinages belong anywhere in the scheme, it is under "sanctioned accipiens", and one sub-class thereof concerns solely the formation of new expressions,

to wit, "shortening".

The answer to the question, how many and what primary divisions to have in the classification, did not come from a priori considerations, but the particular primary division here adopted was seen early in my study. The fact that it seems to differ so much from the primary division of Stern, which was really the starting-point of my study, calls for a rather extended comparison of the two divisions.

The important question is, what differences between various processes observed are most significant. Stern reasons as follows (Meaning and Change of Meaning, 7.31, page 169):

...I have stated...that an actual meaning is adequately determined by three factors, the objective reference, the subjective apprehension and the traditional range; in other words, by its relations to the referent, the subject (speaker or hearer), and the word. I shall call them the referential, the subjective, and the verbal relations. I further stated that if two only of these factors are stable, while the third varies, the meaning varies with the third factor. No fourth factor could be found in verbal meaning.

Stern's "three factors" need not be disputed with, but the means by which he transmutes them into the three "relations" of a meaning looks like pure verbal trickery. For example, why the traditional range of a word should be called a verbal relation of a meaning is not clear to one who looks beyond mere phraseology. When Stern sub-divides his "shift of verbal relation", the classes strike one as being ill-assorted: analogy and shortening. Shortening does, indeed, involve a shift of verbal relation, in that the word changes

form while other elements of meaning remain stable, but what has this to do with traditional range? On the other hand, a shift of verbal relation is hard to discern in the operation of analogy, while, if the traditional range of a word is through it affected, the same may be said of all classes of change of meaning proper!

The skeleton of Stern's definition of meaning is "The meaning of a word...is identical with...elements of...subjective apprehension." (Compare, in this essay, page 11, foot-note 7: "Meaning...is...mental content or...the relation which it bears to the linguistic form.") Yet subjective apprehension is one of the "relations" of meaning, which may "shift" as do the verbal relation and the referential relation. Can a single thing be both meaning and a
15
relation of meaning to the subject?

15

My present personal judgment of Stern's work is as follows: His preparation for the work was of the best, involving thorough study and seeming comprehension of practically the entire literature of semasiology, as well as the attaining of competence in the field of psychology. His discussion of the elements of meaning, its psychology, and numerous side-issues is clear and penetrating and would probably be agreed in by a majority of scholars. His conception of the processes actually involved in various classes of change of meaning is enlightened and, with a few exceptions, correct.

The adverse criticisms I should make to his work are as follows: (1) His psychology is not so narrowly neurological and objective as I should like, and the varieties of mental activities with which he deals exhibit too much heterogeneity. (2) He ranges figures of speech among changes of meaning. (3) In all of his work of systematization he seems weak: his first division is on a not very significant basis, and within the divisions he groups classes which are neither closely related to each other nor adequately described by the title of the larger class.

inclusive. But the particular bifurcation here adopted was discovered empirically, not from any feeling that there ought to be such a division. Some cases of change were discovered in which the new meaning appeared suddenly, without the necessity of a gradual process of coming to be, and others, characterized by a gradual process of this kind. These obviously belonged to mutually exclusive and jointly inclusive classes, to wit,

1. Change in which the new meaning is implied ab initio in the series of uses which establishes it.
2. Change in which the new meaning is NOT implied ab initio in the series of uses which establishes it.¹⁶

16

Practically this cleavage turns out to correspond more or less to Stern's distinction of intentional changes (creative) and unintentional changes (inchoate).

Changes of the first class were called "creative changes" (and this name is not intended to imply willful manipulation of language, but only just what is stated in the definition above). Those of the second class were called "inchoate changes"; Stern's term adequation (a favorite also of Stöcklein) can be used without violence for this entire class.

As to the subdivision of these classes: The study took its departure from Stern and had throughout a Sternian bias. But as a consequence of some original doctrines, such as the doctrine that figures of speech do not involve a change of meaning (see pages 16-17), some of Stern's explanations and classifications had to be abandoned.

It was found that all the cases of the first class, creative change, fell into either of two groups, the "analogy"-group and the "error"-group. Into the former group were gathered most types of Stern's "analogy" and his "shortenings" and "nominations" (minus figures of speech). Into the latter were placed "substitution" and "phonetic associative interference" (a branch of Stern's "analogy") along with two original headings, "contamination by the sphere" and "the gross error" (see below). Inchoate change includes Stern's "adequation", "regular transfer", and "permutation." This class may be characterized generally as a return to a "normal" or typical word-meaning-situation relation from a usage in which that relation had something abnormal or atypical about it.

A detailed justification of the classification here proposed and its relation to the classification of Stern will be found in the remaining portion of this chapter.

2. Creative Change.

a. Analogy.

In speech-activity, analogy is all-pervasive. If we frame an original sentence, we are guilty of proceeding by analogy. Analogy plays so great a rôle in phonology and in syntax, that it is not surprising to find it playing a considerable rôle also in semasiology.

From section 1 it will be seen that Stern classifies analogy as one of the two subdivisions of his shift in verbal relation.

1. Analogy Proper, or Stern's Correlative Analogy.

The following of analogies is evidence of abstraction without reasoning in mental processes. Just as we can acquire a general technique for a skill which takes many various and unexpected forms, we have the capacity of filling out the unknown element in a proportion without realizing that it is a problem in proportion that we are solving. To make plain what is meant by abstraction in mental processes, the example can be given of the analogical formation of an adverb in ly. A speaker is in the habit of using the adjective rapid, then turning around and, in another situation, using the adverb rapidly. But this habit must not be tied up with these particular words in describing the process which follows, but rather with the abstractions ADJECTIVE and ADJECTIVE-ly or, better, with the syntactical patterns in which these abstractions find place. Now, an entirely new adjective (for example, the slang word dopey 'foolish') enters the vocabulary and finds a place in the syntactic patterns: the habit comes into operation, and when the pattern calls for a word like rapidly, dopily is used.

17

The abstraction spoken of does not, therefore, have an objective existence as in higher mental activity; the speaker is unaware of it. The word names a mental phenomenon of obscure neurological cause, irrelevant to the theory.

In the example cited there is the creation of a form, but no semasiological change. Analogy changes meaning under

the following conditions: Of a pair of words in some wise correlated, one has two meanings; the meaning of the other is correlated to one of these two. Subsequently the word with the single meaning acquires a second meaning correlated to the other meaning of the first word.

Stern classifies analogy as follows (page 207):

(1) Combinative analogy, consisting in the isolation and fresh combination of meanings, basic or relational.

(2) Correlative analogy, consisting in the naming of a referent with a word that is evoked owing to its semantic correlation to another, known word, in the same, or in another language.

(3) Phonetic interference, consisting in the semantic influence of one word on another, owing to phonetic similarity.

The first two classes are essentially the same thing, and the name correlative analogy is applicable to both; hence in this essay the term is generalized. Phonetic interference may be active in correlative analogy, but in abstracto it is not an analogical process at all (as Stern admits); hence it is here given a separate head (section e below).

Stern's sub-classification is as follows:

- Combinative analogy.
 - Flexional groups.
 - Derivational groups.
- Correlative analogy.
 - Within one language.
 - Two languages involved (sense-loans).
 - Single words, semantic similarity only.
 - Single words, semantic and phonetic similarity.
 - Phrases.
- Phonetic associative interference.
 - Change of meaning, but not of referent.
 - Change of both meaning and referent.

The action of analogy was compared above to the solution of problems in proportion. The essentials of these problems are two pairs of word-meaning complexes related as follows: Supposing a and b to be two expressions, m and n to be two meanings, while o is a third meaning and x an unknown (rather, a non-traditional) meaning. Then, given

$$\frac{am}{bn} = \frac{ao}{bx},$$

solve for x. The answer is obviously

$$x = \frac{no}{m}.$$

18

Of course, exactly as with an analogical process which results in the emergence of a new form, the unknown term in the actual psychological situation is the form, if we take the speaker's point-of-view. The proper diagram, then, is

$$\frac{am}{bn} = \frac{ao}{x \frac{no}{m}}.$$

But aside from the fact that this scheme would cause the introduction of a term p, which must then be proved to be equal to no/m, the scheme given in the text serves quite well for purposes of illustration and is an accurate formula for the working of analogy for the listener.

Whatever is common to m and n can be cancelled out; thus, if $m = qr$ and $n = qs$, then $x = ro/s$. If $m = nq$, $x = qo$. If $n = mr$, $x = o/r$.

Below are given some of Stern's examples in the proportional form:

Combinative analogy
Flexional groups

$$\frac{\text{raper 'sooner'}}{\text{rap 'soon'}} = \frac{\text{raper 'earlier'}}{\text{rap 'x'}}$$

Derivational groups

$$\frac{\text{faste 'firmly'}}{\text{fast 'firm'}} = \frac{\text{faste 'swiftly'}}{\text{fast 'x'}}$$

Correlative analogy

Within one language

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\text{red letter day 'saint's day in the calendar'}}{\text{black letter day 'non-saint's day'}} \\ &= \frac{\text{red letter day 'auspicious day'}}{\text{black letter day 'x'}} \end{aligned}$$

Two languages involved (sense-loans)

Single words, semantic similarity only

$$\frac{\text{levis 'not heavy'}}{\text{light 'not heavy'}} = \frac{\text{levis 'not deep (sc. sleep)'}}{\text{light 'x'}}$$

Single words, semantic and phonetic similarity

$$\frac{\text{arriver 'come up'}}{\text{arrive 'come up'}} = \frac{\text{arriver 'attain success'}}{\text{arrive 'x'}}$$

Phrases: Stern here places analogical changes in meaning which occurred at first in set phrases only, the word later being abstracted and recombined. The analogy worked on the phrase, but the change was effected in the word, the other elements being analyzed as unchanged.

For phonetic associative interference, see section e below.

ii. Analogy and Permutation.

Analogy can be a contributing factor to other causes of semasiological change. Permutation (section 3.c.ii below) is a sort of inchoate change in which a shift of mental focus in the image corresponding to a word-complex is followed by a re-analysis of the complex on lines quite different from those which characterized the original synthesis.

This re-analysis naturally often follows the lead of complexes which bear a formal resemblance to the complex undergoing the change.

b. Sanctioned Accipiens; i.e. Analogy on Great Groups.

It is a striking but easily verifiable fact that words may be used in new meanings without causing the least surprise or resistance. The first man who spoke of doing a Steve Brodie ('taking a dive, especially from a bridge or other high place to the water') did not have to trouble himself to explain to his listeners how it was that a personal name could denote an act such as a dive. People were prepared for such a sudden, creative use of a personal name, and had been prepared for centuries. There was a community sanction for such a use. We may look upon the use as analogical: the entire body of word-meaning complexes correlated as these two (Steve Brodie 'a certain man' and Steve Brodie 'a famous act performed by that man') furnished the ratio for the proportion.

19

Why "analogy on great groups"? Because in this type the plurality of the models is essential.

Stern says (page 292): "Intentional naming and analogy here touch." With three substitutions, this statement can be rendered more accurate: "Sanctioned accipiens²⁰ and

20

Accipiens means, of course, 'thing to be accepted'.

analogy are the same thing."

For every sanctioned accipiend there was a "first case" or a group of "first cases", in which the secondary meaning was got by some process other than through a sanctioned accipiend. The secondary meaning may have been associated with the primary in these first cases through accident or through some non-semasiological development later obscured (as by phonological change); the development may have been irregular, a sort of tour de force; or these first cases may have come about through a regular process of semasiological change such as are treated in this chapter.

21

A complete semasiological lexicon would give all cases of verbal relationship such as are here being treated, with dated examples, just as it would give examples of prefixes and suffixes.

Perhaps the first analogue of a Steve Brodie was a tour de force or a foreign importation. It must have caused a great deal of astonishment, amusement, and disapproval. But perhaps by its very shocking nature, its patness, concision, and originality, it won out. "First cases", of course, are commonly hid in antiquity.

Sanctioned accipiends have an easier time of it than cases of analogy such as are treated in section a. Their acceptance is guaranteed, although their diffusion is not. If they are not needed or not liked, they die.

The class includes cases belonging according to Stern under "shortening" and "nomination," with some cases of

"specialization" and "particularization (unique use)" which he places under adequation. To determine whether a specialization or particularization really belongs with adequation or whether with sanctioned accipiens, it is necessary only to enquire whether the change in meaning be creative or not. If it is creative, a sanctioned accipiens explains the change.

Not all cases of Stern's "nomination" are included. His classification of this type is as follows:

- Intentional naming.
- Intentional transfer.
 - Intentional transfer (non-figurative, purely cognitive).
 - Transfers based on similarity.
 - Transfers based on other relations.
 - Figures of speech (more or less emotive transfers).

Intentional naming involves the appearance of new forms, and as such either does not involve change of meaning (e.g., gas, kodak) or is explained as a transfer or substitution (air-ship) or as a specialization (house-party).²²

22

Stern does not point out that new compounds are not creations of new words any more than new syntactic combinations are. Specialization may occur in such a compound: the general meaning may be said to be the sum total of all conceivable special meanings (a house-party might be a party assembled to build a house, a party originating in a house, a party each member of which owns a house, and so on and on); the case is not as with meat-eater, which by the rules of the language can mean only 'one that eats (ate, will eat, etc.) meat.'

Figures of speech as such are banned from the classification used in this essay. A figure of speech does not

exhibit a change of meaning of the words involved (see pages 16 and 17). Stern felt this in the case of irony, but apparently could not find a terminology to schematize and simplify the problem so that it could be disposed of. (See Stern, page 338.) Quite rightly he says: "On the other hand, if the ironical expression becomes habitual, adequation may set in, and the depreciative meaning becomes the real meaning of the word." But in view of this sentence, Stern is in the position of having treated as a type of change of meaning something which is not a change of meaning.

1. Intentional Transfer.

Stern says (page 293): "Intentional transfer is the intentional denoting of one referent by a name that really belongs to another, the reason being a desire for a more adequate symbolization or communication." The distinction between this and regular or unintentional transfer may seem slight. Let it be stated in this manner: Intentional transfer permits the inference of "first cases" and the subsequent "sanction". The first cases of regular transfer, however, needed no sanction and gave rise to none, because they did not shock. The psychological process in the regular transfer is not analogical procedure, but is occasioned by a temporary or permanent shift of mental focus. For this reason, regular transfer will here be classified as a variety of shift of mental focus affecting a simplex.

Border-line cases between intentional and unintentional

transfer may occur. Shift of mental focus may have prepared for an unintentional transfer, but in making it the speaker may realize that it is a transfer and invoke the sanction for it.

Intentional transfer is a process of analogy on great groups. For each such process, it will be necessary to specify which great group permits the analogy, and how the correlations of meaning in the "first cases" came about. Here the great group is correlatives based on similarity. The "first cases" include correlations resulting from regular transfer and adequated metaphors.

An example of intentional transfer is wall 'lining tissue'. Other examples are given by Stern, page 294.

Stern extends the name transfer to correlatives based on other relations than similarity. I prefer to do without a general name, as will be seen from the title of the next sub-section.

ii. The Use of Inventors' Names and Similar Phenomena.

Sandwiches are named for the inventor of sandwiches, an Earl of Sandwich. A waco (in drug-store cant) is a Dr. Pepper, a beverage originated in Waco, Texas. The correlations are respectively invention-inventor and commodity-source. The first cases may have been shortenings, adequated metonymies, or permutations.

iii. Specialization-Particularization; Unique Use.

Stern divides his "adequation" into "adequation after

previous sense-change" and "adequation without previous sense-change." The latter type he classifies as follows:

Specialization.
Generalization.
Pregnant use.
Particularization.

Obviously all of these types can be intentional and creative. When a zoologist gives members of the genus *Felis* the name cat, he performs an intentional generalization of the name. So most pregnant uses today are probably creative, based on sanction; compare a car what am a car (morphologically influenced by the meaningless slogan de ham what am). Nor is adequation required to explain many cases of particularization which enter speech without question. Stern may have meant to include such cases under his "intentional transfer," but he made no reference to them there.

Of course, adequations produced many "first cases" to serve as Vorlage for the intentional uses. Not only shift of mental focus, but also evanition (see below) in synecdochisms and other metonymies may give rise to models.

iv. Shortening: Clipping and Omission.

Shortenings are not direct causes of change of meaning. A shortening which results in an expression for a certain meaning identical with the expression for another meaning has merely produced a pair of homonyms. Therefore it would not be necessary to deal with shortenings in this essay if it were not for the fact that a meaning of a word often allows equally well, as an explanation for its origin,

shortening or another process.

A shortening has taken place in a particular expression or in a type of expression, if, in the history of the meaning expressed thereby, that meaning has been usually expressed by a greater amount of articulate activity than at present. Shortenings may be natural and, indeed, unintentional, but they are creative (not of new meanings, but of new expressions).

An omission may sometimes be regarded as a figure of speech, and the assumption of the entire meaning by the remaining words to be occasioned by evanition.

Stern classes shortenings as either clippings or omissions. He explains as follows:

Clipping is the shortening of a unitary verbal symbol, as bus for omnibus, auto for automobile; omission is the total dropping of one or more verbal symbols forming part of a combination, as private for private soldier, fall for fall of the leaf.

"Unitary" here means: forming a semantic unit.
(pages 258-259)

When omnibus is shortened to bus..., no sense-change can be involved, because the stump is an entirely new word. When the stump happens to be identical in form with a previously existing word..., the new word is rarely identified with the old word by linguistic feeling: they are apprehended as homonyms, and consequently there is no sense-change. Similarly when two shortenings give the same result...

In omissions, on the other hand, the verbal symbol or symbols pronounced are, by definition, identical not only in form but also in fact with previously existing words, and sense-changes are bound to follow in all cases where the shortening becomes habitual.

The unitary symbols of the form black-bird present an intermediary type, which is discussed in 10.3. (page 259)

When Stern says that two words are identical in fact, he means that they are identified or appreciated as identical. This identification, a process following closely upon shortening (omission), might be called a phonetic associative interference; or, maybe more happily, the evanition of a figure (ellipsis) or the analogical sanctioned accipiend.

c. Contamination by the Sphere.

The next three sections may be said to concern the "error group." The first two, "contamination by the sphere" and "error", are characterized by the following peculiarity: as phenomena affecting the language of individuals only they are open to correction and elimination by further experience and the gathering of more material for induction. A correction of this type on a national scale may be called, using Stern's word, substitution.

Contamination by the sphere (which may be called contamination for short) is a process producing change of meaning when a speaker adopts an expression from a certain sphere (national, social, literary), and uses the expression with a meaning changed by the inclusion of some mental content connected with the sphere rather than with the "referent" itself. From the point-of-view of the listener, one could make a case for calling this an inchoate change, since the contamination takes place in the mind of the adopter as he listens, simply by the addition of the sphere to his mental content. This is, however, not really an adequate description

of what happens. The social station or language of a speaker is a part of the circumstances of discourse, as also, of course, his vehicle (conversation, the lecture platform, the printed page). But the change (not evanition) of such a circumstance need not bring about a change of meaning: witness many borrowings which have occurred without contamination. The adopter may, depending upon his training, his needs, and the like, allow the evanition of the circumstance to add something to the meaning. Thus réclame is the ordinary French word for 'advertisement'; the Germans could have taken it over uncontaminated; but creatively they allowed the element of Frenchiness, hence pejoration, to enter into their use of it, Reklame.²³

23

This is assuming that the pejoration did not first enter in in the French.

Stern discusses such changes under "pregnant use" (pages 411-415). Their classing as adequation can be defended, but the appropriateness of the term pregnant use is open to question.

Sombrero in Spanish means 'hat'. In English it means 'Mexican type of hat.' The content 'Mexican' has come from the sphere, from which the word was adopted.

A German who was not acquainted with Zähre as a modern dialectal word might learn it from reading ancient poetry. He may adopt the word, but a Zähre to him is always more

noble than a mere Träne.

Obviously pejoration as well as appreciation is possible.

Of course, individuals do not usually act as centers of infection for changes of this sort; but the change is of a sort such as many are liable to. (See foot-note 24 below.)

Contaminations by social sphere may lead to differences in class-dialects.

d. Error.

i. The Gross Error.

This section might have been titled "Premature Induction," if it were not that one can never know when one's experiences are ripe for induction. One must always do the best with the material at hand.

We are always changing our associations with words; that is, differences quite frequently exist between the meaning we attach to a word and the meaning others do. This incongruence is of little importance for the linguistic community. But, just as a contamination to which a large number of persons is liable independently of each other (see above) is of importance to community semasiology, so is an error to which a large number of persons is liable.

24

Contaminations and errors committed by literary men and persons of importance publicly may be of social significance. Neither the endemic nor the epidemic type of origination should be rigidly excluded from our theory.

To a reader of the book Frankenstein, the name in the title is associated with the young doctor who makes an artificial man. A frankenstein is now a creation which destroys or brings to grief its creator. If we do not dignify this perversion by the name of metonymy, we must ascribe it to error.

A clearer case is inferiority complex 'diffidence'. This meaning arose from error, or, if you prefer, ignorance.

The malapropism should be classified usually as a phonological change dependent upon a faulty image (perception, memory) of a word. See, however, section e, "Phonetic Associative Interference."

ii. Inevitably Incomplete Induction, Individual and National; Substitution.

This section does not introduce a really new type of "error", but serves to dispose of Stern's class, substitution, by relating it to error.

Recalling that error is a technical term meaning practically '(avoidably) premature induction', one will be able to follow this relating. The communal or national meaning of a word (surely a valid abstraction) is a more or less stable factor to which to refer "errors." When individuals perfect their associations with words to agree with the national meaning, semasiological change in the language (as a national concept) has been avoided. When they fail to do so, semasiological change in the language occurs. (Section i.)

But supposing the national meaning to depend, itself, upon an incomplete induction, then the way is open for a more perfect association and a consequent semasiological change on a national scale. When pens were quills, lexicographers might have defined pen as 'quill to write with'. They would have been wrong, far|wrong. What pen really meant was 'pointed instrument for writing with ink'. But everybody in the world was ignorant of the fact that pen did not mean 'quill...'. We have, however, to take into account this erroneous meaning. Now, when steel pens were invented, people found out their error; the association with the word pen was perfected. Later the appearance of the fountain pen called for a further perfection.

The erroneous meaning 'quill to write with' was a lexicographer's blunder, for ever since penna had been adequate from 'feather' to 'writing instrument', the element 'feather', though present in the image, had been irrelevant.

True, if we, with Stern, include the fringe of the image in the meaning, we have a change of meaning when an element of that fringe is corrected.

The question easily arises, how a substitution can be distinguished from a transfer. A substitution has little in common with an unintentional transfer, which is a two-fold inchoate change (see section 3.c.1 below), while a substitution is creative. (A steel pen is introduced; immediately it is named a pen.) It differs from an intentional transfer

in at least two important ways: (1) It requires no sanction; (2) the result is a generalization. The first of these two characteristics suffices to distinguish the transfer from the sanctioned generalization (page 37), which is not a popular process.

As Stern says, the change in meaning involved in substitution is due to external causes. But if meaning is defined, as in this essay, as a relation between expressions and mental content, then all change in meaning can be detected by a disturbance in one of these two elements. If, then, consideration of "externalities" can be postponed until these externalities have some effect upon the expression-mental content relation, it would be useless to introduce externalities as a third element upon which to base one's classification, unless, indeed, some striking simplification were gained thereby.

e. Phonetic Associative Interference.

Phonetic associative interference, as Stern admits, is quite a different thing from the other processes by him included under "analogy". Stern's name is very good. The phenomenon may be looked at in this way: a single word produces two responses at once, which influence each other; the mental focus is eventually shifted through intensification of a characteristic of one image by the other image (the characteristic may have been in the fringe); or new images arise from the combination, just as they would from the

juxtaposition of two words. (Such a mental shift is creative.)

After phonetic interference has produced a correlation between two meanings which were formerly not correlated, a phonetic correlation may take place in the forms (or form, if only one result) by analogy. This is not semasiological change, but its association with semasiological processes and its usually close chronological situation with respect to those processes probably caused Stern to confuse it with semasiological analogy and to classify the whole dual process (interference and morphological analogy) under semasiological analogy.

Some of the examples given by Stern follow. He makes a division into "change of meaning, but not of referent," and "change of both meaning and referent." Under the first head, he says (page 234):

Sandblind is probably a perversion of OE sam-blind 'half-blind, dim-sighted, purblind'. The first syllable, at a later period, became incomprehensible, and was interpreted as sand-. Cf. Johnson's explanation in his Dictionary: "having a defect in the eyes, by which small particles appear to fly before them". The noun standard has been affected, in many of its senses, by an association with the verb to stand; it is possible that in some uses it should be regarded as an alteration of stander.

In samblind, as soon as it was impossible to isolate the meaning of sam from the meaning of the whole (there being few or no analogues), the images aroused by it became vague. The association of 'sand' with the sound, previously prevented

by the more suitable association of 'half' therewith, was made use of. The image of sand appeared, and the combination of 'sand' and 'blind', not quite being too absurd, was retained. The connection between the sand and the blindness might have been even more vague and absurd than Dr. Johnson stated it to be; in fact, there hardly needed be any rational connection at all. Immediately, the meanings of sand and samblind being correlated, the forms were likewise (more perfectly) correlated, producing sandblind.

In standard, the possibility for the influence of stand was even greater. Standard looks like a derivative of stand. And the association of poles and other vertical objects with standards aided the connection from the semasiological point-of-view.

Phonetic associative interference may reinforce an adequation. And when the interference is gradual, the change may be classified as shift of mental focus.

When the change of meaning implies a change in the "referent" (the typical situations in which the word is employed), it simply signifies that no rational point of connection could be found between the primary meaning of the expression and the interfering association. Stern suggests the case of belfry. Hypothesizing his interpretation of the history of the word to be correct, one may represent it in this fashion: A belfry was formerly a wooden tower, usually movable, used in besieging fortifications. Such a tower, of

course, would not contain bells. Yet (Stern suggests) interference by bell produced the meaning 'bell-tower' by a combination of 'bell' and any associable meaning of 'belfry', to wit, 'tower'.

It is easy to see why phonetic interference should be included in the "error group" of creative change.

In all three types of the "error group", the fomenters of the "errors" may know better; it was not necessary for any one to be ignorant of the fact that a belfry was a siege-tower; the misuse of frankenstein may have been originated by one who knew the book well; one who speaks of a sombrero may know (and would hardly care) that sombrero in Spanish applies to any hat.

3. Inchoate Change or Adequation.

This class corresponds (more or less) to Stern's "regular" types of change, his transfer and shift of subjective relation (permutation and adequation). All changes classifiable here are unintentional, although motives in speech play a considerable part in explaining them (see page 15). Some creative changes are also unintentional.

a. Evanition of One of the Vehicles or Circumstances of Expression.

A re-reading of pages 16 and 17 will render a detailed explanation of this cause of change unnecessary. The change is especially well illustrated by the fate of figures of speech. When a figure of speech has been frequently used,

the circumstance of "figure" evanishes. As long as a vehicle of expression is appreciated, it does work. As it passes from appreciation, the work is done by whatever is left.

Thus, silly could once express the meaning 'foolish' only in conjunction with the use of irony or euphemism. When these circumstances evanished, silly was left, still expressing that meaning, but now without aid.

b. Quotidiation.

A change often closely connected with "evanition" is quotidiation, or the re-association of an expression with biologically significant mental content (the Sprechlage) when the intended meaning is not significant. (Compare pages 13-16.)

In the section on evanition, there was no mention of motives. It was assumed that the mental content intended agreed with the significance of the situation for the listener. Thus, in the pregnant use, He is a man: the speaker means 'a man of preëminent qualities;' this meaning is the significant meaning and remains when the circumstance of using a figure of speech (pregnance) is forgotten.

Quotidiation is seen in pure form in the lie. The name Greenland (Danish Grønland) is really a lie; the land is not green. Greenland has come to mean 'a certain icy land.'

The affective element of a meaning frequently changes through quotidiation: When a tourist first reads on the

road-map improved road, he has a pleasurable image. After experience of improved roads, his image is distasteful.

Hyperboles often undergo both quotidiation and evanition, that is, when the intention of the speaker is for the hyperbole to be taken at its face-value or at least to influence the mental content of the listener in the direction of the hyperbole. But a hyperbole may undergo quotidiation alone, if it is still appreciated as a hyperbole. Thus, in mountains of cake, the expression is still appreciated as a figure of speech, but no one is deceived into thinking that the cake approached mountainous proportions. On the other hand, in frightfully tired there was probably never any intention to make a listener believe that the fatigue really could frighten; but frightfully has been adequated through evanition to a normal expression of 'very.'

Quotidiation can divest a metaphorical or otherwise grandiose expression of insignificant importance. The very circumstance of employing a metaphor lends some importance to what one says.

In a euphemism there is an insignificant indirectness in the meaning. Quotidiation straightens this indirectness out.

c. Shift of Mental Focus.

Shift of mental focus is the type of change of meaning par excellence, for the elements are as simple as may be and the psychological causes not difficult to understand.

An image has certain characteristics. Certain of these characteristics furnish the starting-point for the relation of the image as a whole with other mental content for use in reasoning, making predictions, and the like. Characteristics not so related are unused characteristics. (See pages 15-16.)

A relation may become disused because an activity of the organism has been discontinued. A new activity opens up new relations. The characteristics which are furnished with used relations may be termed the foci of the image. As characteristics begin or cease to be used, the focus of the image shifts.

Synthesis (page 18) is to be explained by an inchoate sharing of associations by images or parts of an image formerly possessing distinct associations connected only through the mediation of their mutual association. (This mutual association itself has become so rapid that the images, parts of images, or characteristics may be said to be unified.)

1. Shift Affecting a Simplex.

This class of change corresponds on the whole to Stern's "adequation without previous sense-change". A conspectus of his subdivision of the whole class "adequation" follows:

Adequation after a previous sense-change.
 After substitution.
 After analogy.
 After shortening.
 After nomination. (Here see especially my
 evanition and quotidiation.)
 After transfer.
 After permutation.

Adequation without previous sense-change.

Specialization.

Generalization.

Pregnant use.

Particularization. The unique use.

By "specialization", Stern means concentration on certain of the characteristics of a referent (a procedure which causes generalization). That term will here be abandoned in that use, specialization instead being associated with particularization (see below). For "pregnant use", the term evaluation will be substituted. The classes of shift of mental focus affecting a simplex are therefore (1) generalization, (2) evaluation, (3) specialization-particularization.

The distinction between special and particular cannot be made hard and fast: a particular is a one-membered species, and a species is... a particular species (!). Particularization will be treated here as a type of specialization, the latter term doing duty for both concepts. A distinction can be made whenever it is useful.

The distinction between quotidiation and shift of mental focus may prove to be of little utility with further investigation. Both depend upon significance and use. A specialization takes place because the mental content evoked by a given word has too few characteristics for the situation. These characteristics are used nevertheless, whether from being produced by the context or from being provoked by the vital exigencies of action. And their use associates them with the word.

Whether from mental laziness or some other cause, we are fond of using general terms where special ones are more accurate. Especially where the danger of ambiguity has been reduced by circumstance, we succumb to this vice. Instead of saying, "Down by the Colorado," we say, "Down by the river." (The identity of the river cannot be mistaken.) Instead of, "That horse," the Ozark mountaineers are supposed to have said, "That creature." Sometimes there is no intention to evoke a more special image; often the specialization of mental content is naturally produced by the context: "that horn"--"he blew that horn." But since a particular species of creature was present in the mind, when the mountaineer said creature, the word began to evoke an image of that special animal, the horse, whenever the word was presented. A particular relation of the horn was continually presented, and soon in certain contexts, the focus of the image aroused by horn was on the capacity for being blown. 'An animal's horn for blowing' is a specialization of 'an animal's horn'.

The general term may be used because there is no special one available; thus probably with English corn, used in America for maize. (The Indian name was not learned until after corn had become fixed.)

Generalization is illustrated by Stöcklein's anziehen. Formerly one spoke of drawing on the boots. But this was a case of an image, not too poor in characteristics, but too

rich. Of what importance was the mode of getting the boots on? The important thing was getting them on. The drawing was relegated to the fringe. Anziehen might now be said to mean 'put on'; it could be used on occasions when a shirt, a cravat, or a coat was concerned in the putting on. Stern calls this extension a "transfer".

Generalization may take place immediately after a specialization: when horn came to mean 'horn to blow', the meaning was too rich. What matter the material of the instrument? The important thing was the capacity of being blown. The hornishness (material) of the horn (instrument) was relegated to the fringe, and horn might be used of an instrument of metal, wood, etc.

The generalizing process is seen also in Stern's "regular (unintentional) transfer," exemplified by the application of leaf to the leaf of a book. This, however, is a temporary generalization, which lasts only long enough for the transfer to take place, then becomes inoperative. For leaf does not really have the meaning 'any object shaped like a leaf.' We do not conceive of leaves as forming one grand class, but rather a set of discrete classes. It is decidedly zeugmatic to say, "The leaves of the trees and the book." So when we learn that the Bibbs Pin Co. manufactures straight pins, safety pins, and rolling pins, the effect is comical.

The class here named evaluation may be described as an

overflow from the class, contamination (pages 39-41). In contamination, the speaker's attitude towards a sphere from which he borrows a word causes him to change (usually to specialize) the meaning of that word. In evaluation, the word is not adopted but has been in the speaker's vocabulary for some time. As he uses it, the emotive element of his mental content approaches nearer and nearer the focus until it is within the focus and possesses it. The emotive element may not be purely a feeling of liking or disliking, but it may be a characteristic of the referent about which the speaker feels strongly. As with creature 'horse', a used and significant element intrudes itself; but the effect may not be specialization. For example, lewd used to mean 'unlearned'. When those who spoke of unlearned men did so, the loose morals of such people were present to their minds, for they attributed lewdness to the unlearned as a class. Eventually lewd came to mean 'unchaste.' (Or was this case effected through a euphemism?)

ii. Permutation: Shift Affecting a Complex.

By "shift affecting a complex" is meant 'shift affecting the inner organization of a complex (phrase), or its piece-by-piece relation to the mental content.'

The characteristic mental shift in a permutation is synthesis (see pages 18 and 50). But synthesis of itself does not produce any startling effects. It is the re-analysis which causes violent change.

Bead once meant 'prayer'. There was a synthesis of the expression tell one's beads 'count one's prayers', the syn-

thesis gradually becoming more and more intimate. The new word prayer ousted bead from less closely synthesized combinations. As Stern says, the phrase tell one's beads was equivocal; the words could describe the situation whether bead meant 'prayer' or 'bead'. The used characteristic of the image seems to have been the beads; perhaps the medieval supplicant was more preoccupied with beads as such than with that which they were supposed to tally. At any rate, in looking at a man using a rosary, one saw the beads but not the prayers. As soon as the focus was on the beads, bead would be taken to mean 'bead.'

Later a generalization transferred the term to beads not on rosaries.

One is certainly justified in calling permutation a subclass of adequation, for the psychic process is the same.

CHAPTER IV

A Classification by Effects

Outline:

1. The Causes and the Corresponding Effects.
2. Tabulation of the Effects.
3. Implication of the Table.

In investigating the semasiological history of any particular word, one is given only the meanings; the causes of change are to be found through the application of reason. It is obvious that if any of the causes of semasiological change are capable of having results a and b only, then a result c cannot be ascribed to those causes. This suggests a simple criterion for use in assigning cause.

The result of a change of meaning can be most simply described by the relation which exists between the former meaning and the subsequent meaning, and this will be termed the effect of the change or of its cause.

In this chapter, first the causal types of change treated in chapter III will be reviewed, after each type being noted the relations between meanings which may be caused by the operation of the type (effects). Then the relations will be classified as types of change with respect to results.

1. The Causes and the Corresponding Effects.

1.a. Analogy. Analogy assumes a previous semasiological

change in a word not directly under consideration, which change is imitated in the word under consideration. The logical relation between the two meanings of the considered word will be the same as that between the two meanings of the other word, which might be of any nature. The presence of any particular logical relation between meanings of a word does not, then, offer a priori evidence in favor of or against the operation of analogy.

b. Sanctioned Accipiens. i. Intentional Transfer. For present purposes (without any proposal that the usage be established in the terminology), transfer has been limited to Stern's "transfer based on similarity." The relation between the pairs of meanings may perhaps most conveniently be described as a metaphorical relation. Of course, there is no implication that a metaphor has been used.

True, generalizations occur when a genus is named by one of its species, but the old special meaning is not lost. (Compare cat 'Felis domesticus' and 'Felis'. With pole-cat, the relation must be described as metaphorical.)

ii. The Use of Inventors' Names and Similar Phenomena. Obviously, in keeping with the term just introduced (metaphorical relation), the term metonymic relation or relations is appropriate. It may be questioned whether relations similar to those observed in still other figures of speech may not be attributed to sanctions. This is quite possible, but in investigating any example of suspected hyperbolically

related sanctioned accipiens, for example, care must be taken that a genuine hyperbole (for which a sanction exists, too!) is not under consideration, in which case no change of meaning can be spoken of.

iii. Specialization-Particularization. The very name of this class is based on the effects of the change.

iv. Shortening. For this tabulation it is permissible to enquire only into the results of omission. The effect is usually a specialization, a primary or attribute of a given generality retaining the more special meaning of the combination affected by the omission.

c. Contamination by the Sphere. Specialization always results, usually pejoration or appreciation.

d. Error. i. The Gross Error. No all-inclusive description of effects can be given, but generalization, specialization, and particularization are all common. The generalizations could be distinguished from the effects of intentional transfer by their being unintentional.

ii. Inevitably Incomplete Induction. The "error" itself would be said to produce specialization. But the special meaning is the primary one, and the interest attaches to the "correction" (substitution). The effect of Substitution is generalization.

e. Phonetic Associative Interference. The effect is sometimes specialization, but no general description can be made.

2.a. Evanition. All the figures of speech which might affect meaning will have corresponding to them types of effects of evanition: simile, metaphor, allegory, metonymy, synecdoche, ellision (?), hyperbole, litotes, pregnancy, irony, euphemism, and humorous misuse of language.

b. Quotidiation. Not all the effects of quotidiation can be tabulated. Sometimes the relation is negative, like that corresponding to irony (so in evanition). Sometimes it corresponds to hyperbole, litotes, or euphemism. Quotidiation may be distinguished from evanition by the existence in quotidiation of the intent to deceive (as to significance). As said on pages 48 and 49, evanition and quotidiation may both have effect on the same word.

c. Shift of Mental Focus. i. Shift Affecting a Simplex. The effects are, of course, generalization and specialization or particularization. Regular transfer results in metaphorical relations. Evaluation produces irregular effects (compare lewd), similar to specialization, but perhaps most satisfactorily denominable as a metonymic relation.

ii. Permutation. This is another change of irregular result; the effect is sometimes a relation like that in metonymy or synecdoche (see Stern, pages 362-376).

2. Tabulation of the Effects.

The main heads in the following table are types of effects; the subdivisions are types of causes.

1. Specialization.
 - a. Sanctioned accipiens: specialization, shortening.
 - b. Contamination by the sphere.
 - c. The gross error.
 - d. Phonetic associative interference.
 - e. Shift of mental focus.
2. Pejoration.
 - a. Contamination by the sphere.
 - b. Quotidiation (?), shift of mental focus (?).
3. Appreciation.
 - a. Contamination by the sphere.
 - b. Quotidiation (?), shift of mental focus (?).
4. Particularization.
 - a. Sanctioned accipiens: particularization.
 - b. The gross error.
 - c. Shift of mental focus.
5. Generalization.
 - a. Intentional transfer.
 - b. The gross error.
 - c. Substitution.
 - d. Shift of mental focus.
6. Metaphorical relations.
 - a. Intentional transfer.
 - b. Evanition.
 - c. Shift of mental focus: regular transfer.
7. Metonymic relations.
 - a. Sanctioned accipiens: the use of inventors' names and similar phenomena.
 - b. Evanition.
 - c. Shift of mental focus: evaluation (?), permutation.
8. Synecdochic relations.
 - a. Evanition.
 - b. Permutation.
9. Relations resembling other figures.
 - a. Evanition.
 - b. Quotidiation.
 - c. Sanctioned accipiens (?).
10. Negative relation (opposites).
 - a. Evanition (irony, ?euphemism).
 - b. Quotidiation (irony, ?euphemism).
11. Relations not classified above.²⁵

25

The causes listed under this head, when they have not been included under a certain head above, may nevertheless be the causes of those effects by virtue of the indeterminacy of the relationship they cause.

- a. Analogy.
- b. Shortening.
- c. The gross error.
- d. Phonetic associative interference.
- e. Quotidiation.
- f. Shift of mental focus: evaluation, permutation.

3. Implication of the Table.

The table can serve to limit the number of processes to be considered in determining the cause of a given change under observation. It cannot lead directly to the determination of cause. Its use must be supplemented by the examination of the word (or expression) itself in contexts lying in the whole period of time containing the change of meaning. But in spite of the scrupulous consideration of every contextual clue, of border-line cases, of chronology, of psychology, even of history, in many, if not most, instances, a certain cause must be given as only the most probable, other possibilities being left open. And often the semasiologist can offer no better support of the alleged probability than his own intuition.

Is semasiology destined to remain in this state of indeterminism? Not at all; it will be rescued by one important branch of the study of meanings. Cutting across the various classifications applied in this essay to meanings or the relations of meanings to one another, are classifications of meanings themselves as "notions," as regions within the mental frame-of-reference of the universe. For example, we can speak of words denoting color, words denoting time when, words denoting manner of locomotion, and so on and on. These classes should be examined, to see whether there are general trends affecting them, independently of history and accident.

When a change of meaning is investigated, the semasiological history of all synonyms of the two terminal meanings should be investigated. This will at least help to determine whether the two meanings are really genetically related or whether the later of them is to be derived from some third meaning of the same word. But, in addition, this examination en masse of these words will enormously multiply the number of citations in literature for any given change and will allow investigators to observe the behavior of the meaning-class at the present time under laboratory conditions.

In reference to affixes, one of which is investigated in part II of this thesis, it may be pointed out that the history of the meaning of an affix is the history of meaning of many individual words bearing that affix, and that mass-comparison of trends is thus to some degree imposed by the very nature of the study. The investigation of synonymic affixes, however, proved too vast for the present study, and it must be carried on as a supplement thereto.

26

I had intended to give three parts to this essay, part one, A General Theory of Change of Meaning, part two, Aspects of Semasiological Theory Not Treated in Detail in This Thesis, and part three, A Semasiological History of High German in(t)-, en(t)-. The second part was to have complemented the first, so that the two in conjunction would form an outline for a complete treatise on general semasiology. It was decided, however, that the second part as projected was not contributive directly enough to the particular problem which formed the basis of my thesis.

It will be interesting, nevertheless, to observe the questions which I had prepared as an outline for the projected part two. They are as follows: How does a given

meaning abandon and acquire expression? Do entirely new meanings arise? Can we determine the primal meaning of words or roots? In semasiology can we obtain an insight into the very origin of expressions for given notions, or of language itself? Are there constant trends affecting the expression of classes of notions? Ought semasiological change be arrested? How? Are some languages less adequate for expression than others? Can we by semasiology draw conclusions concerning the life and thought of past times? Can we by semasiology better determine the meaning of literary works, aiding exegesis and criticism? But if we derive our semasiological theory from an interpretation of the words of literary remains and in part also from a knowledge of the life and thought of past times, are such reverse conclusions valid? Can criteria be found for the readier determination of the cause of change operating in a given observed case in which the meanings are known?

PART TWO

A SEMASIOLOGICAL HISTORY OF HIGH GERMAN in(t)-, en(t)-

CHAPTER V

Preliminaries

Outline:

1. The Problem.
2. Method.

1. The Problem.

In this portion of the essay, the general consideration of the field of semasiology is left behind and the application of the principles developed in part one begun.

The change in meaning exhibited by the prefix now found in standard High German as ent at all stages of its recorded existence is to be discovered and systematized in a genetic scheme, and an attempt will be made to assign the causes for each shift.

The chief forms in which the prefix has appeared in High German are int, in, ent, and en. The forms with i prevailed in the Old High German period, and those with e in the Middle High German period. In modern times only ent is found. Other forms will be mentioned in the citations from various authorities given in chapter VII. The phonology of the prefix will not be discussed except insofar as it is connected with semasiological interference.

Ent (for this form will be used generally to include all variants) is an inseparable verbal prefix; it does not, then, bear the stress. It has a stressed doublet ant, surviving now only in Antlitz, Antwort, and antworten. This doublet has not been included in the investigation. When a verb was found with a prefix ant and there was a corresponding noun in ant, it has been concluded that the verb is a derivative from the noun, and the meaning has not been investigated. Verbs in which ant alternates with in(t) or en(t) or which have no nominal correlative have, however, been treated. The a may be due to Old Saxon influence.

2. Method.

The genetic classification of the meanings of ent presented in this essay represents a considerable amount of work and thought not here put into words. That work may be described as alternate mutually corrective induction and deduction. First, dictionaries and grammars were consulted and the examples given therein given especial attention, to discover just what was added to the meaning of the simplex in the derivation of the compound. With help from the authorities, these increments of meaning (referred to henceforth simply as the meanings of the prefix) were tentatively arranged in a genetic scheme with a tentative explanation for each shift. The stages by which this scheme had been arrived at were subsequently gone over critically, and the scheme thereby revised.

Then examples of the prefix from early monuments and from Gothic were defined and placed in the classification,

the arrangement of the meanings being corrected with a view to the chronology of appearance. The arrangement and explanation of the transitions, even the number of categories was continually revised. The aim was to make the explanations the simplest and the most credible, in accordance with the law of parsimony.

A final scheme or group of categories (as they will be called) was arrived at. Then a chronological table of examples was drawn up and explanatory notes thereto begun.

It is evident that the various words in which an affix is found must have semasiological histories of their own. These histories were treated in the notes to the table, but the aim was to get back to the meaning the word had when the compound was formed, for only that meaning could throw light on the development of ent. Compounds were therefore classified according to their original meaning, and for a justification of their inclusion in such-and-such a category, reference must often be made to the notes.

One may reason a priori that permutation is an important factor in the semasiological life of any affix. The exact contribution of the prefix to a derivative was often open to equivocation, and even in the face of the simplex, the popular mind was unlikely to make a logical analysis of the compounds preparatory to forming new ones on their analogy.

One result of the prevalence of permutation in the

semasiological history is the existence of many equivocal cases, in which the prefix may be interpreted in either of two ways. In these cases, an effort was made to arrive at a decision from the context, (if the word was a gloss) the translation, or, as a last resort, Sprachgefühl (admittedly shaky in dealing with dead languages). Sometimes the chronology of the example decided.

All examples of the Gothic prefix and in verbal compounds have been treated. No High German usage is derived from a Gothic usage, but the Gothic uses of the prefix are probably carried over in large part, and possibly entirely, from the Primitive Germanic period. At the least, the development in Gothic illustrates what could happen to the prefix.

The conclusions of the thesis will be given in the form of an article for a hypothetical semasiological dictionary.

CHAPTER VI

Non-Germanic Cognates

Outline:

1. Indo-European.
2. Greek.
3. Latin.
4. Lithuanian.
5. Sanskrit.

1. Indo-European.

From August Fick's Wortschatz der Grundsprache, der Arischen und der Westeuropäischen Spracheinheit, 1890, erster Theil of his Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Indogermanischen Sprachen, 4. Aufl. (See Bibliography.) Page 3:

ántô beegne, stehe entgegen.

Als Verb nur im Griechischen ἀνταπαῖ erhalten; dazu s. anto-, anti Denominal kann ἀνταπαῖ nicht wohl sein.

ántos m. Ende.

ved. ánta m. Nähe, Grenze, Ende. irisch ind inn, altwelsch in hin "Ende". got. andeis, nhd. Ende. Das Ende ist als Gegenüber gedacht.

anti gegen, entgegen.

ved. ánti gegen, in der Nähe. lat. ante antid-ea. got. and, and-bindan, nhd. ent-binden, vgl. ἀντην ἔντα und got. anda-nahti.

From Karl Brugmann's Vergleichende Laut-, Stammbildungs- und Flexionslehre nebst Lehre vom Gebrauch der Wortformen der Indogermanischen Sprachen, 2. Bearb., 1911, pages 802-805:

5. *anti, *anta 'sich gegenüber, angesichts', 'über hin, entlang'.¹⁾

1) Schriften über griech. ἀντί s. bei Hübner

Grundr. griech. Synt. 71ff. O. K ü b l e r De differentia inter particulas ante et prae intercedente, Breslau 1850.

616. Der Ausgang -ti steht für's Ai., Griech. und Lat. fest. Ai. ánti nur Adverb 'sich gegenüber, vor sich, in der Nähe' (z. B. śátrum ánti ná vindasi 'du findest gegenüber (vor dir) keinen Feind'). Griech. ἀντί. Lat. ante aus *anti, vgl. anti-sto und antiquos, das wie ai. prātika- (1, 589) gebildet ist.

Got. anda- and- (z. B. anda-nems 'angenehm', and-niman 'annehmen'), ahd. ant-, vgl. griech. ἀντα ἀντήν 'gegenüber'. Die in der Bedeutung von anda- and- abweichende adnominale Präposition got. and war vielleicht ursprünglich *anti. Lit. ant, dial. anta.

Arm. ənd, in dem wahrscheinlich ursprünglich verschiedene Präpositionen zusammengefallen sind, entspricht, mit dem Genitiv verbunden, dem griech. ἀντί, mit dem Akkusativ verbunden, dem got. and. Im Auslaut kann ein kurzer Vokal jeder Qualität geschwunden sein. Vgl. Finck KZ. 39, 501 ff. Bezüglich des Anlauts ə-, der aus der proklitischen Stellung zu erklären ist, s. Meillet Gramm. de l'arm. S. 4.

Der Ansatz eines Substantivs *ant- 'Stirn, Angesicht' als Grundlage der ganzen Sippe (so zuletzt Thurneysen Wölfflin's Archiv 13, 28f.; Thes. 1. L. 2, 127), ist sehr unsicher. Dass ἀντί den echten Genitiv zu sich nimmt, ist keine Stütze für diese Hypothese, weil Verbindung dieses Kasus mit alten echten Raumadverbia gerade im Griechischen eine ganz gewöhnliche Erscheinung ist. Über ahd. andi endi N. 'Stirn' sehe man 2, 1, 164. Griech. ἀντί und ἀντα können sich als ἀν-τί (§573, 2) und ἀν-τα so zu einander verhalten, wie πρo-τί und κᾶ-τα. Man muss aber wegen der Bedeutungsverschiedenheit 'sich gegenüber, angesichts' und 'über hin, entlang' zweifeln, ob man es nicht mit zwei etymologisch zu trennenden Raumadverbia zu tun hat. Mit der ersteren Bedeutung könnte leicht *an-t- zu got. an-par ai. an-yā-h gehören (S. 336), mit der zweiten zu *an = griech. ἀν (§613); vgl. zu letzterem §618, 2, a über lit. ant. Aus diesem Grunde scheint es mir angemessen, wenigstens bei dem adnominalen Gebrauch (§618) zunächst nach jener Sinnesverschiedenheit einzuteilen.

Anm. Auf Grund seines Gebrauchs möchte man auch got. und mit 'Dat.', 'ἀντί', für, um' heranziehen, z. B. atgēbun ins und akra kasjins 'έδωκεν αὐτὰ (τὰ) πριάκοντα

ἀργύρια) εἰς τὸν ἀργὸν τοῦ κεραμέως, augō und augin
jah tunpu und tunpau 'ὀφθαλμῶν ἀντὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ ὀδόντα
 ἀντὶ ὀδόντος', sowie got. unpa- in unpa-pliuhan 'ἐκφυ-
 γεῖν' und ags. oð- aus *unþ- in oðsangan 'entgehen'
 u. a. (vgl. and-sitan usw. §617). Dann wäre neben
 *ant- ein *nt- anzusetzen, und von diesem letzteren
 Raumadverbium zu trennen das got. und und 'bis' (§ 649);
 ähnlich sind im Germanischen in ahd. unter zwei Präpo-
 sitionen zusammengefallen (§646 und 672).

617. A. Vielleicht ist unser Raumadverbium durch-
 gehends erst einzelsprachlich Präverbium geworden. Auf
 semantische Übereinstimmungen wie griech. ἀνθ-ίσταμαι
 und got. and-standa 'ich stelle mich entgegen, wider-
 stehe' ist in dieser Beziehung um so weniger Gewicht zu
 legen, als got. and- aus anda- entstanden zu sein scheint
 (§616). Ob arm. and- in einem der Verbalkomposita, die
 es enthalten (Meillet Mem. 16, 126f.), z. B. in and-
unim 'ich nehme auf' (Aor. an-kalay), hieher gehört
 (vgl. §616), weiss ich nicht zu entscheiden.

Bei Homer ἀντι-φέρομαι 'begebe mich einem gegen-
 über, messe mich mit ihm', nachhom. z. B. ἀντι-τίθημι
 'setze, stelle gegenüber, entgegen', ἀντί-φημι 'be-
 haupte dagegen'.

Lat. antisto, antepōno, antecēdo.

Im Germ. ist im allgemeinen von 'entgegen, gegen-
 über' auszugehen. Ahd. intstantan 'gegenübertreten und
 stehen' wie got. and-standan. Got. and-niman 'ent-
 gegennehmen, annehmen, in Empfang nehmen', ahd. ant-
neman 'adsumere'. Got. and-saihan 'ansehen, berücksich-
 tigen', mhd. ent-sehen 'anblicken', vgl. ἄντα ἰδεῖν.
 Got. and-weihan and-sakan 'widerstreiten', vgl. ἄντα
 μάχεσθαι, ἀντ-αγωνίζεσθαι. Perfektivierend hat unsere
 Präposition den Sinn 'von -- weg' angenommen, z. B.
 got. and-bindan ahd. intpintan 'entbinden, losbinden',
 ahd. int-faran 'entfahren, entgegen'; der Kulminations-
 punkt eines Entgegenhandelns schliesst immer zugleich
 den Begriff einer Trennung in sich, vgl. z. B. got.
and-sitan ahd. ant-sizzen 'sich entsetzen', mhd. ent-
springen, ent-wenden. Vgl. Aeschyl. Prom. 337 ὁρμῶμενον
 δὲ μηδαμῶς μ' ἀντισπασσῆς 'zieh mich nicht in meinem
 Streben ab (eigentlich: auf die andere Seite)'.

618. B. 1) 'Sich gegenüber, angesichts'.

a) Mit G e n i t i v (§517, 3). Griech. ἀντὶ
 'angesichts, gegenüber, vor' im Kret., Delph., Att.,
 z. B. gort. ἀντὶ ματιύρων τριῶν 'angesichts dreier

Zeugen'...

b) Mit dem A k k u s a t i v lat. ante 'gegenüber, vor', Cic. post me erat Aegina, ante me Megara; zeitlich 'vor', ante tempus statutum, ante lucem. In jeder Weise war post das begriffliche Oppositum (§700, 3).

c) Finck KZ. 39, 538 möchte auch arm. and mit A b l a t i v 'zur Seite' und mit L o k a t i v 'mit, bei' auf *anti 'angesichts' zurückführen.

2) 'Über -- hin, entlang, im Verlauf von, während'.

a) Mit dem G e n i t i v (§517, 3). Lit. añt (auch anta) 'auf' hat sich, wie es scheint, an die Stelle der durch griech. ἐν preuss. na no- aksl. na vertretenen Präposition gesetzt (§613ff.), was zu Gunsten etymologischen Zusammenhangs von añt mit *an = griech. ἐν spricht. Z. B. añt káлно užíłpti 'auf den Berg hinaufsteigen', žėda añt pifszto neszióti 'den Ring auf dem Finger tragen'... Im Griech. ist, wie es scheint, ἐντὶ mit dem Sinn 'während' anzuerkennen: Kos ἐντὶ νυκτός 'während der Nacht' u. dgl., vgl. ἐντὶ μῆνα unter b) (Günther IF. 20, 71f.).¹⁾

1) Schwierig ist delph. ἐντὶ φέτος SGDI. n. 2561, A, 45 ἀγειν δὲ τὰ πελλεῖα ἐντὶ φέτος. S. zuletzt hierüber Buck IF. 25, 259f.

b) Mit dem A k k u s a t i v. Got. and 'längs, über (an, auf) etwas hin': usgagg and wigans jah fapōs 'gehe hinaus längs den Wegen und Zäunen', usstaig ana smakkabagm, ei gasēhi ina, unte is and pata munaida, paifrhgaggan 'ἀνέβη ἐπὶ συγκομοραίαν, ἕνα ἕστη αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐκείνης ἐμελλεν δειρχεσθαι', jah mēriþa urrann and all gawi bisitandē bi ina 'καὶ φήμῃ ἐξῆλθεν καθ' ὅλης τῆς περιχώρου περὶ αὐτοῦ', leikinōndans and all 'θεραπεύοντες πανταχοῦ'. Arm. and mit derselben Bedeutung: ev el hambav znmanē and amenain kolmans gavafin 'καὶ φήμῃ ἐξῆλθεν καθ' ὅλης τῆς περιχώρου περὶ αὐτοῦ'... Griech. vereinzelt ἐντὶ μῆνα κατὰ μῆνα Hesych. Lit. dialektisch, z. B. ant Asaria, sunu Obed, ateija dvase 'auf (über) A., den Sohn O.'s, kam der Geist' (Bezenberger Beitr. z. Gesch. d. lit. Spr. 243f.).

Regrettably, Hirt's and Walde's works were not available for consulting.

2. Greek.

From Émile Boisacq's Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, seconde édition, 1923, page 64:

ὄντα ἄντην 'en face'; ἀντικρύ, att. ἄντικρυς 'en face de, directement'; ἄντομαι 'aller au-devant'; ἀπ-αντάω 'rencontrer'. Cf. ἀντί. Prellwitz 25 rappelle skr. ántah 'fin', got. andeis v. h. a. anti 'fin', qui sont étrangers au groupe.

. . . .

ἀντί: 'en face de; en place de'; ἀντιός 'qui est en face, qui vient au-devant de'; ἀντιάς, -άδος f. 'glande de la gorge, amygdale; inflammation des glandes de la langue'; ἀντιάω ἀντιάσω 'rencontrer'; ἀντιός 'qui est en face de, adversaire', κατέ-ναντι κατέναντα 'en face de, à l'encontre de'. Voy. ἄντα. Skr. ánti 'en face de, devant, près de', arm. and 'sous, avec, pour' (Finck Kz. 39, 501-539). Lat. ante < *anti, v. lit. anta 'sur, vers' lit. ant, got. and 'le long de, sur, par-dessus' v. isl. and- ags. and- ond- v. h. a. ant-.

From Henry George Liddell's and Robert Scott's A Greek-English Lexicon, 8th ed., copyright 1882, page 140:

ἀντί, Prep. governing gen.:--orig. sense over against. (From ANT, come also ἄντα, ἄντην, ἄντιος (as ἄπιος from ἀπό), ἄντη, ἀντικρύς, ἄντομαι, ἀντάω; cf. Skt. anti (opposite, facing); Lat. ante, anterior;--Goth. and as a Prep., O. Norse and A. S. and- as a Prefix, as in and-svar and and-svaru (answer); Germ. ant- in ant-worten, etc.)

A. Usage, I. of Place: opposite, over against, formerly quoted from several places of Hom.... 2. answering to, of the accompaniment to a song...

C. in Compos, it signifies, 1. over against, opposite, as ἀντιβαίνω, ἀντίπορος. 2. against, in opposition to, as ἀντιλέγω, ἀντίβιος. 3. one against another, mutually, as ἀντιδιείσομαι. 4. in return, as ἀντιβοηθῶ. ...

3. Latin.

From Alois Walde's Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, 3. neu bearb. Aufl. von J. B. Hofmann, 1930, pages 53-54:

ante "vor, vorher" (seit XII tab., rom., auch ab-de-ante; anteā "vorher" seit Ter.), o. a n t 'usque ad' (? vgl. u.), a n t k a d u m 'occidionem?': aus *anti (vgl. antistes, anticus) = gr. ἀντί (*ἀντι?) m. Gen. "angesichts, gegenüber, vor, für, anstatt" (ἄντα, ἀντην "gegenüber", ἀντικρύ att. -ς "entgegen, geradewegs", ἀντομαί, ἀντιάω "begegne"); ai. anti Adv. "sich gegenüber, vor sich, in der Nähe" (anti-kāh "nahe"); idg. *anta in got. anda-, and- Praev. (anda-nemeigs 'ἀντ-εχόμενος', and-bindan "auflösen" usw.), and- [sic] Praep. m. Akk. "entlang, über -- hin, auf -- hin", an. as. ags. and-, ahd. ant-, int-, mhd. nhd. ant-, ent- (Kompar. an. endr "früher" = got. andiz- in andiz-uh "entweder", ags. end "vorher", ahd. enti aus *andiaz "früher"); lit. ant, alit. und dial. antā m. Gen. (selten Akk.) "nach -- hin, auf, während, für"; vl. arm. end- Praev. "auf-", end Praep. m. Akk. "entlang, gegen", m. Gen. "anstatt", m. Instr. "unten" (ə- aus a- durch die Proklise, Auslautsvokal unbestimmbar, s. Finck KZ. 39, 501ff., Meillet MSL. 9, 155. 12, 429. 16, 126); idg. *nt- in got. und m. Dat. "für, um", unpa- (ags. oð-, aī. unn-) in unpa-pliuhan "entfliehen"; vl. auch got. und m. Akk. "bis zu" (untē Konj. "bis, solange als" aus *und-pē, as. unt(i), ahd. unzi "bis", s. Feist² 398 [nicht zu l. endo, Vendryes ZcPh. 17, 78]; ahd. unti enti inti, nhd. und vlm. zu ai. áthā "dar-auf"), o. a n t m. Akk. 'usque ad' (Walde Sprchl. Bez. 54; anders Brugmann Grdr. II² 2, 836: aus *nti, Erw. von *en, *n "in" wie der Bed. halber lit. dial. iñt m. Akk. "nach" [wenn nicht eher Contamination von in und ant, Fraenkel Post- und Präp. 54f.]; unklar gr. dial. ἐντε "bis" neben ἐντε). -- Die weitere Analyse von idg. *anti, *anta ist unsicher; ἀν-τί, ἄν-τα wie προ-τί, κά-τα nach Brugmann a. O. 803 (mit hypoth. Ansatz zweier *an-); ein Subst. *ant- "Stirne, Angesicht", wo- von *anti Lok. Sg. wäre (zuletzt Thurneysen ALL. 13, 28f.; Pokorny ZcPh. 15, 195; gegen ἄντα als Akk. Sg. s. Günther IF. 20, 70), wird jedenfalls durch a n t i a e, antiöper (s. d.) nicht erwiesen, da idg. *antios "gegen-überliegend" vom Adv. *anti gebildet ist, auch nicht durch a n t ē s, -ium (s. d.), das als t. t. milit. bzw. agr. sekundär von ante nach frontēs, -ium gebildet scheint; St. *ant- sonst nur in air. ētan "Stirn"

(*ant-ono-) und in ai. ánt-ah m. "Ende, Grenze, Rand" (vgl. ántamah, antyah "der letzte"), woneben aber *antiō- in got. andeis m. = an. endi(r), ags. ende, ahd. anti, enti, nhd. Ende, das von *antiō- in an. enni n. = ahd. andi, endi "Stirn" nicht zu trennen ist.

a n t i d- in antid-eā (alte Formel bei Liv. 22, 10, 6), antid-hāc "vorher" (Plaut., Com. inc., Archaismus, s. Schmalz⁵ 819), antid-eō "gehe voran" (Plt.) mit -d- wie in postid-eā (Plt., danach postid ds. nach post-eā : post) nach prōd- neben prō- (antid-eō nach prōd-eō, Walde LEW.² 47); nicht aus *anti + d(e) mit Lindsay-Nohl 666. 676 noch aus *anti + id "das, recht" in ai. nēd "(damit) nicht" (s. nī) mit Prellwitz BB. 22, 771, J. Schmidt KZ. 32, 407; eā, hāc in antid-, anteā usw. adv. Abl. (Wedding BB. 27, 27f.).

Hierher u. a. a n t e r i o r "der vordere, frühere" (seit Cels., Gegensatzbildung zu posterior wie anteritās Gl. zu posteritās, Wackernagel Synt. I 246); s. auch a n t ā r i u s, a n t ē s, a n t i l ē n a, a n t i c u s, -quus. -- Verbal-kompos. (nach Brugmann a. O. 803 erst einzelsprchl.) u. a. altlat. anteeō (antid-) "gehe voran", antistō "stehe voran, übertreffe" (: gr. ἀντι-ἵσταμαι, got. usw. and-standan "widerstehen"), antecellō "rage hervor" (s. celsus), antecēdō (s. antecessus), antepōnō; vgl. auch antegeriō. -- Walde-P. I 65ff., Brugmann Grdr. II² 2, 802ff., Fraenkel IF. 40, 86ff.

From Thesaurus Linguae Latinae editus auctoritate et consilio Academiarum quinque Germanicarum, Berolensis, Gottingensis, Lipsiensis, Monacensis, Vindobonensis, 1900, volumen ii, columns 127-132:

ante adv., praep. [ante anti- antid- i.q.osc., a n t (p ū n t t r a m) 'ante (pontem?)', gr. ἀντί, ind. ánti 'in conspectu, coram'. casus localis videtur esse nominis ant- 'frons, facies', fortasse non diversi ab antes vocabulo (q.v.), cf. c. hibern. Étan, theodisc. endi 'frons', gr. ἀντα εἰσάντα, got. and (anda-) 'per, secundum', lituan. ant 'in, super' et c. antiae. Th.] Prisc. gramm. III 26, 10 'ante ora patrum' (Verg. Aen. I, 95). hic 'ante' τὸ πρό significat, quod est praepositio Graeca. at vero: 'ante leves ergo pascentur in aethere cervi' (Verg. ecl. I, 60) et 'ante pererratis

ambobus finibus exul' (ibid. 62), hic 'ante' τὸ πρότερον significat et est sine dubio adverbium. III 40, 16 ante et componitur et separatur: antepono, ante domum. et significat πρὸ Graecam localem vel temporalem, ut anteeo προπερεύομαι, ante annum πρὸ ἐνιαυτοῦ. invenitur etiam sine casu, quo loco adverbii accipitur e.g.s.; cf. ibid. 46, 12 Pomp. gramm. V251, 17. Gloss.

I adverbium: A. loci: 1 ubi Cic. ac. 2, 125 innumera-
biles supra infra dextra sinistra ante post...mundos
esse. Tim. 48 et ante et pone...et sursum et deorsum...

II praepositio: A. loci (cf. Kuebler p. 5 sq.): apud
Plautum cum vocabulis aedes fores ianua ostium
porta lungitur et tum statum tum motum designat ex hisce
pendens verbis: accipio (Cist. 675 Pers. 758) ...
iaceo (Amph. 1072) ...sto (Amph. 406. 603. 667 Truc. 335)...

1 ubi: (ante aedes, portam simil. v. supra.) Sis.
hist. 182 ante testitudinem constitit. Varro sat. 457
in foro ante lanienas ludere. Lex Iul. Corp. I 206, 34
apud forum ante tribunale suum propositum habeto, quam
viam...locaturus sit....

2 quo: (ante aedes, portam sim. v. 131, 7.) Rhet.
Her. 1, 24 lege ad imperatorem. Tib. 2, 5, 66 iacta-
vit fusas et caput ante comas....

From the Spanish Academy's Diccionario histórico de la
lengua española, tomo I, 1933, page 603:

ANTE. (Del lat. ante.) prep. En presencia de,
delante de....

2. En comparación, respecto de....

3. adv. t. ant. Antes...

4. Lithuanian.

For a detailed explanation of the present meaning of
Lithuanian ant, see Friedrich Kurschat's Grammatik der
Litauischen Sprache, 1876, sections 1436-1439, pages 389-
390.

5. Sanskrit.

From Sir Monier Monier-Williams's A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, new ed., 1899, page 44:

अन्ति 1. ānti, ind. before, in the presence of, near, RV.; AV.; (with gen.) within the proximity of, to [cf. Lat. ante; Gk. ἄντι]. -griha (ānti-), m. neighbour, RV. x, 95, 4.... -deva (ānti-), mfn. being in the presence of the gods, near the gods, RV. i, 180, 7....

CHAPTER VII

Germanic Cognates and High German

Outline:

1. Primitive Germanic.
2. Gothic.
3. English.
4. High German.

1. Primitive Germanic.

From Alf Torp's Wortschatz der germanischen Spracheinheit, 1909, page 13:

and, anda adv. und präpos. gegen, ent-. Siehe und.
g. anda-, and- präf., and präpos. mit akk. auf -- hin,
an -- herab, -- entlang; an. and- präf. z. B. and-
lit n. Antlitz, and-virki n. Arbeit, Ertrag, Gerät
(vgl. mhd. antwere Kriegsmaschine, Gerät), andsvar n.
Antwort (vgl. as. antswōr, ags. andswaru, engl. answer);
as. ags. and-, as. ant präp. mit akk. usque ad, ahd.
ant- (int-), nhd. mhd. ant-, ent-. Vgl. lit. añt
präp. mit akk. auf (alt anta). -- gr. ἄντα, ἄντην, ἄντί.
-- lat. ante, antid-ea. -- skr. ánti entgegen, vor.

. . . .

anþiz, andiz früher, vormals. an. endr, enn früh-
er, vormals, wieder, noch; ags. end vorher; ahd.
enti früher, vormals, mhd. ent, end conj. ehe be-
vor. Komp. zu anda.

andô, anþô f. vestibulum. an. ond f. (und onn)
vestibulum. Vgl. lat. antae f. pl. Pfeiler vorn
an beiden Seiten der Tür. -- arm. dr-and Türpfosten.
(Die Zugehörigkeit zu ig. ant- unsicher wegen skr.
âtâ f. Umrahmung der Tür.)

anþia n. Stirn. an. enni n. Stirn; ahd. andi,
endi n. Stirn. Vgl. lat. antiae f. pl. die
Stirnhaare. -- ir. étan Stirn. Vgl. gr. ἀντίος.

andia m. Ende. g. andeis m. Ende; an. endir m.

dass.; as. endi m.; ags. ende m.; ahd. anti, enti, mhd. ente, ende m. n., nhd. Ende n. Vgl. skr. ánta m. Ende, Grenze, Rand, antya der letzte.

From Hermann Hirt's Handbuch des Urgermanischen, Teil

II: "Stammbildungs- und Flexionslehre," 1932, page 126:

and, g. and(a)-, ahd. ant-, as. and-, entspricht in der Bedeutung dem gr. ἀντί 'gegen', lit. añt mit Gen. 'auf, zum Zweck von', und die Bedeutung 'entgegen' findet sich im Got. noch.

G. and-standan 'entgegenstehen, widerstreben': gr. ἀνδ-ἵστημι 'entgegenstellen'.

Dazu mit Schwundstufe got. und, ἀντί τινος augo und ugin

und-rinnan 'hinlaufen', undrēdan 'besorgen', und-greipan, unþabliuhan.

2. Gothic.

From Sigmund Feist's Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Gotischen Sprache, 2. Aufl., 1923, page 34:

and Prap. ἐπί, κατά, διά entlang, über -- hin, auf -- hin. In Zuss. die vollere Form anda- (meist mit Subst.).

Aisl. and-, ae. and-, ond-, as. and, ant-, ahd. ant-, int-, ent- (nur in Zuss.) entgegen.

Gr. ἀντα (ἀντην) gegenüber; lit. dial. anta auf, zu; arm. and (O. Finck, K. Z. 39, 537 ff.) Prap. mit Akk. = got. and, mit Gen. = gr. ἀντί, ai. anti gegenüber, lit. añt auf, zu, lat. ante (aus *anti) vor. Idg. Gdff. anta und anti.

From Wilhelm Streitberg's Die Gotische Bibel, 2. Teil, "Gotisch-Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch," 2. Aufl., 1928, page 9:

and Prap. m. Akk. entlang, über -- hin, auf -- hin. 1. rauml. nach Verben der Bewegung, Verkündigung u.ä.

διά τινος: ἀναβαυτες ἐπὶ τὸ δῶμα διὰ τῶν κεράμων.
 and skaljos L 5,19; ἐκείνης διέρχεσθαι and þata
 þairhgaggan da vorüber L 19,4 k 11,33 E 4,6. --
 ἐν τινι: κηρύσσειν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν merjan and
 bourgs M 11,1 L 7,17 R 9,17. -- εἰς τι M 9,26 L 3,3
 4,37 14,23 Mc 1,28.39 14,9 R 10,18. -- ἐκ τι L
 4,25. -- κατὰ τινος M 8,32 L 4,14 8,33 Mc 5,13. --
 κατὰ τι L 8,1.39 9,6 15,14; Sk 2,24 4,10 5,6. --
 2. zeitl. nur κατὰ ἑορτήν and dulþ warjoh auf
jedes Fest M 27,15 Mc 15,6. -- In Zusammensetzung
and-: anda- (231).

From Wilhelm Streitberg's Gotisches Elementarbuch, 5.

und 6. Aufl., 1920, page 160:

231 Der Wortakzent ruht bei den german. N o m i -
 n a l k o m p o s i t i s von Haus aus auf dem e r -
 s t e n, bei den V e r b a l k o m p o s i t i s da-
 gegen regelmäßig auf dem z w e i t e n Gliede. Die-
 se Regel hat auch im Gotischen gegolten (§36,2). Wir
 können daher folgende Betonungsunterschiede aufstellen,
 die sich in der d o p p e l t e n F o r m der Präpo-
 sition anda- (nominal) and- (verbal) deutlich wider-
 spiegeln: 1. N o m i n a l b i l d u n g e n wie af-
lets M 'Erlasz', ana-filh N 'Überlieferung', á n d a -
h a f t s F 'Antwort', á n d a - þ á h t s adj. Part.
 'bedächtig, vernünftig', bi-mait N 'Beschneidung',
faura-gaggi N 'Vorsteheramt', frá-lets M 'Erlasz', uf-
kunþi N 'Erkenntnis' usw. gegenüber 2. V e r b a l -
 b i l d u n g e n wie af-létan 'erlassen', ana-filhan
 'überliefern', a n d - h á f j a n 'antworten',
a n d - þ á g k j a n sik 'sich besinnen', bi-maitan
 'beschneiden', faura-gaggan 'vorangehn', uf-kunnan 'er-
 kennen' usw. Hier ist, wie and- gegenüber dem anda-
 der Nomina zeigt, das Präfix zur Zeit der germ. Akzent-
 verschiebung ein selbständiges Wort gewesen, hat sich
 erst später mit dem Verbum zu einem einheitlichen
 Ganzen verschmolzen, vgl. Hermann KZ 33,531. Daher die
 Unbetontheit des Präfixes. Wenn A. Kock (IF 30,248)
 fürs Gotische einen Wechsel der Betonung zwischen Prä-
 fix und Verbum annimmt, so wird dies durch die Intona-
 tionsverhältnisse n i c h t bestätigt¹⁾.

1) Wie Sievers beobachtet hat, ist a in der Kom-
 positionsfuge nach Fallton erhalten, nach Steigton
 geschwunden.

3. English.

From F. Holthausen's Altenglisches etymologisches Wörterbuch; 1934, page 5:

and- 2, auch an-, a- Präf. "ant-, ent-", afr. as. ais. and-, ahd. ant-, gö. and(a)-, im Afr. u. Got. auch Präp.: afr. and(a), -e, end(a), go. and "in, an, auf, entlang", zu lit. ant, alter anta "auf, zu, für", mbret. enta "also", gr. ἀντί "angesichts, gegenüber, vor, für, statt", lat. ante "gegenüber, vor", arm. and "für, statt, längs, über -- hin, an, auf", ai. anti "gegenüber, vor, nahe", vgl. od-, ūd-, énd(e), öder u. WP I, 65ff....

4. High German.

From Friedrich Kluge's Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, 11. Aufl., 1934, page 133:

ent- Vorsilbe. Dem gr. ἀντί 'gegen, statt', lat. ante 'vor' entspricht germ. *and(a), das im Got. als Präp. and 'entlang, auf etw. hin' erscheint, als betonte Vorsilbe in nhd. Antlitz, -wort fortbesteht (s. d. und anheischig, Handwerk). Als unbetonte Vorsilbe (vor Verben und ihren Ableitungen) entspricht ahd. int-, mhd. ent-. Vor f wird es zu emp-, daher empfangen, -fehlen, -finden aus ahd. int-fāhan, -fāhan, -findan. Gerät ein so entstandenes pf in Mundarten, die kein pf als Ergebnis der hd. Lautverschiebung besitzen, so können Formen wie empfangen entstehen (wie hambel, mumbel, drump, opporn aus Hand-, Mund-voll, Trumpf, opfern): Behagel 1928 Gesch. d. d. Spr. 422.

From Fr. L. K. Weigand's Deutsches Wörterbuch, 5. Aufl., 1909:

ent-: Vorsilbe, mit der Grundbedeutung "gegen". Danach bezeichnet ent in vielen Verben das Werden, Hervorkommen eines neuen Zustandes, z. B. entblühen, entsprieszen, sowie das Versetzen in einen solchen, z. B. entbrennen, entzünden, anderseits in einer noch grössern Anzahl von Verben das Austreten aus dem alten Zustand ("weg", entkommen, entweichen, entgleiten, entwachsen,

entführen) und gewinnt so beraubende (privative) Bed., z. B. entarten, entdecken, entfesseln, enthaupen in Verben, die oft vom Substantiv aus gebildet sind. Vor Labialen geht einigemal ent- in emp- über, s. empören, empfangen, empfehlen, empfinden. Den Substantiven in denen die Vorsilbe ent- erscheint, liegen Verba gleicher Zusammensetzung zugrunde, während bei ursprünglicher Zusammensetzung mit Substantiven noch die ungeschwächte Form ant- (s. d.) sich erhielt. Mhd. ent-, gewöhnlich gekürzt en-, ahd. ant-, int-, gekürzt in-, unt-; dazu asächs. and-, ant-, nld. ont-, ags. on (aus ond-, and-), anord. and-, got. and-, vor Substantiven auch anda-. Als selbständiges Wort erscheint die Vorsilbe in der got. Präp. and "worauf hin, entlang, entgegen", asächs. and "bis". Über die Urverwandtschaft s. ant-. Z. T. liegt dem heutigen ent aber auch die Vorsilbe in zugrunde, namentlich bei den Verben der zweiten Klasse, wie entbrennen.

From Hermann Paul's Deutsches Wörterbuch, 2. Aufl.,

1908, pages 135-136:

ent-, Präfix in festen verbalen Zuss. 1) In den meisten Fällen ist es durch Abschwächung in unbetonter Silbe entstanden aus ahd. int- aus noch älterem ant-, welches starkbetont (in nominaler Zus.) erhalten ist, jetzt noch vorliegend in Antlitz, Antwort. Dieses ant- entspricht griechischem ἀντ und die Grdbd. ist "gegen" (in räumlichem Sinne). Diese liegt den nominalen Zuss. zu Grunde. Noch nahe steht ihr die Verwendung in entbieten, -sprechen, -halten 1, sowie in empfangen, empfehlen, empfinden, in denen empf- durch Assimilation aus entf- entstanden ist. Sonst hat ent- die Bedeutung "von etwas weg" angenommen, deren Ableitung aus der Grdbd. noch nicht aufgeklärt ist. Diese Bedeutung ist am deutlichsten in einer grossen Anzahl von Verben, neben denen der Gegenstand, von dem die Entfernung stattfindet, im Dat. stehen, teilweise aber auch durch eine trennende Präp. (von, aus) angeknüpft werden kann. Intransitiva: entfahren, -gehen, -kommen, -laufen, -springen, -steigen, -schleichen, -kriegen, -schlüpfen, -fliegen, -wischen, -fliehen, -(t)rinnen, -schwinden, -weichen, -fallen, -sinken, -gleiten, -fliesen, -strömen, -wachsen, -stammen; in poetischer Sprache: enteilen, -wallen, -stürzen, -flattern, -schweben, -schäumen, -sprudeln, -träufeln, -beben, -dampfen, -duften, -blitzen, -lodern, -schimmern, -strahlen, -brausen, -rauschen, -schallen, -blühen, -keimen, -wachen (einem Traume) u. a. Seit Kl. haben sich diese Zuss. in

poetischer Sprache sehr vermehrt, wogegen sich schon Schönaich im Neologischen Wörterb. wendet. Transitive: entfernen, -fremden, -führen, -reiszen, -ziehen, -locken, -pressen, -ringen, -rücken, -winden, -nehmen, -leihen, -lehnen; poetisch entdrücken, -saugen, -schöpfen, -schütteln u. a. Ein Akk., der erst durch die Zus. möglich geworden ist und vom einfachen Verb. nicht abhängen kann, steht in poetischer Sprache neben entschmeicheln (einem ein Geheimnis u. dergl.), -winken (Kl., Bürger), -küssen. Kein Dat. steht, weil die Entfernung vom Subj. verstanden wird, neben entlassen, -senden. Ein Dat. ist auch nicht möglich neben den uneigentl. verwendeten entsetzen, -stellen, -heben, -zücken, sich enthalten, -schlagen, sowie neben entschühen, -blößen. Die Vorstellung der Entfernung von etwas hat sich in die des Hervortretens in die Erscheinung gewandelt in entspringen (ein Quell, ein Uebel entspringt), -sprieszen, -stehen 2. In einer Gruppe von transitiven Verben bezeichnet ent- ein Rückgängigmachen dessen, was das einfache Verb. besagt, die Vornahme des Entgegengesetzten. Ausgegangen ist die Verwendung von solchen Fällen, in denen das einfache Wort ein Befestigen, Verbinden, Zusammenlegen oder dergl. bezeichnet. Vgl. entdecken, -hüllen, -laden, -binden, -schlieszen, -gürten, -schnallen, -spannen, -stricken, -falten, -rollen, -wickeln, -wirren, -rüsten, -täuschen, -wöhnen (zu gewöhnen, mhd. auch einfach wenen). Manche der so mit ent- zusammengesetzten Verba sind Ableitungen aus Substantiven, vgl. entadeln, -ehren, -färben, -fesseln, -kleiden, -korken, -siegeln, -waffnen, -weißen, -zaubern, -schädigen. Nach diesen werden dann Zuss. mit ent- direkt aus Substantiven abgeleitet, ohne dass die einfachen Verba in entsprechender Bedeutung vorhanden sind, und diese drücken dann ein Wegnehmen des durch das Subst. bezeichneten Gegenstandes aus vgl. entbürden, -eisen, -erben, -fetten, -haaren, -hauften, (mhd. houbeten in gleichem Sinne, vgl. köpfen), -hülsen, -körpern, -kräften, -larven, -lasten, -lauben, -masten, -nerven, -rätseln, -rinden, -schleiern, -schuhen, -seelen, -thronen, -wässern, -werten, -wölken, -wurzeln, -ziffern, -blättern, -völkern, wonach noch manche andere hie und da, namentlich in poetischer Sprache gewagt werden, vgl. entästen (Goe.), -blümen, -atmen (s. d.), -jochen, -runzeln, -geistern, -göttern. Als Intr. stehen entarten und entgleisen vereinzelt. Einige Zuss. lassen sich an ein Adj. direkt anlehnen: entheiligen, -schuldigen (vgl. besch.), -würdigen, -mutigen (vgl. erm.); danach gebildet sind entmündigen, -christlichen, -sittlichen, -blöden und andere nur poetische Wörter wie entheitern (Kl.), -ähnlichen (Kl.),

-schüchtern (Goe.), -bittern (Rückert). Den an Adjektiva angelehnten Wörtern sind einige aus Substantiven abgeleitete zuzugesellen, die ein Wegnehmen der durch das Subst. ausgedrückten Eigenschaften bezeichnen: entjungfern, -mannen, -menschen, -puppen. 2) In einigen Fällen geht ent- zurück auf ahd. in-, welches mit unserer Präp. in identisch ist und in der Verbalzus. das Geraten in einen Zustand ausdrückt. Die Vermischung beider Präfixe wird zunächst dadurch veranlaszt sein, dasz das t von int- vielfach an den folgenden Konsonanten assimiliert war. An die schon im Ahd. vorhandenen Verba haben sich dann jüngere mit gleicher Funktion des ent- angeschlossen. Hierher zu stellen sind entbrennen, -zünden, -schlafen, -glimmen (poet.), -glühen (poet.), -lodern (poet.), -fachen, -flammen, -schlummern, -schwellen (poet.). Aus en- = in hervorgegangen ist ent- auch in entgegen, entzwei, vgl. auch empor, empören.

From Otto Behaghel's "Zur Lehre von der deutschen Wortbildung," in Wissenschaftliche Beihefte zur Zeitschrift des allgemeinen deutschen Sprachvereins, 3. Reihe, 1896-1901, pages 144-145:

2. Zur Vorsilbe ent-.

Die Zusammensetzungen von Zeitwörtern mit der Vorsilbe ent- zerfallen in zwei Hauptgruppen. In der einen entspricht die Bedeutung der Vorsilbe ganz deutlich der des auch lautlich verwandten griech. *ἀντί*; vgl. z. B. got. *andstandan* entgegenstellen, alts. *anthebbian* standhalten gegen etwas; got. *andhausjan* anhören (sich hörend gegen einen hinwenden, vgl. lat. *oboe-dire*), *ent-gelten* (vgl. griech. *ἀντιδίδωμι*). In der zweiten Gruppe hat ent- die Bedeutung des Loslösens: z. B. *entsetzen*, *entfliehen*, *entladen*, *entkleiden*, *entwurzeln*, *entmannen*, *entmutigen*, *entblößen*.

Man hat nun gemeint, es sei notwendig, noch eine dritte Gruppe anzunehmen, in der von der Grundbedeutung *hinein* auszugehen sei, und bei deren Gliedern die Vorsilbe ent- lautlich mit got. *in* im Zusammenhang stehe (vgl. got. *insandjan* entsenden, *intundnan* entzündet werden). Es ist geltend gemacht worden, dasz neben *entbieten* ahd.

imbot, neben mhd. entbizen imbi-
stehe; die Kraft dieses Hinweises wird jedoch aufge-
hoben durch die Thatsache, dass den beiden eben genann-
ten Zeitwörtern im Altsächsischen die Wörter and-
biōdan und andbitan gegenüberstehen, die
keine Beziehung zum got. in- haben können. Weiter
ist nun Paul ebenso wie Wilmanns der Ansicht, dass es
zum Verständnis der sogenannten Inchoativa der Heran-
ziehung der gotischen Bildungen mit in- bedürfe
(vgl. z. B. entbrennen, entschla-
fen). Ich kann diese Notwendigkeit nicht zugeben.
Einerseits erhebt wieder das Altsächsische Einsprache
mit seinem answetan (= entschlafen), ander-
seits besteht keine Schwierigkeit, an die Grundbedeut-
ung entgegen anzuknüpfen: diese Verba bezeich-
nen "die auf einen Zustand hin eingeschlagene Richtung".
Den einfachsten Beweis für die Möglichkeit dieser Ent-
wicklung liefert das Lateinische, in dem eine ganze
Anzahl von Inchoativen mit der Vorsilbe ob- gebil-
det werden: obardesco, obaresco,
obatresco, obbrutesco, obdor-
mio, obdulcesco, obdulco, ob-
duresco, obduro, obeso, obi-
rascor, oblanguesco, oblenio,
oblitesco, obmutesco, obri-
gesco, obsaturo, obsopio, ob-
stupesco usw. (vgl. Delbrück, vgl. Syntax S.
683).

Nicht ganz leicht ist es zu sagen, wie die Bedeut-
ung der Trennung aus derjenigen der Annäherung, aus der
Bedeutung entgegen entstanden ist. Es fehlt
ja nicht an einzelnen Berührungen beider Vorstellungen:
vgl. entbrennen -- losbrennen,
entblühen -- erblühen (er- = got.
us- aus), entgegennehmen -- abneh-
men, anhängen einem -- abhängen
von einem, anhören -- abhören;
man sagt einem ab, indem man ihm ent-
gegenspricht, man schlägt etwas
weg, indem man es zurückschlägt, ihm
entgegenschlägt. Dem deutschen an-
binden entspricht griech. ἐκδέω; im Lateinischen
ist ob- in einigen Zeitwörtern der trennenden Be-
deutung nahe gekommen, vgl. obeo, obli-
viscor, obloco, obrodo, obrogo,
obsoleo, obsorbeo, opperio
(omitto?).

So hat sich denn auch bei anderen deutschen Vor-
silben aus dem Begriff der Annäherung der der Trennung

entwickelt. Bis ins Neuhochdeutsche reichen derartige Bildungen mit *be-*, vgl. *benennen*, *berauben*, *beschneiden*. Ich verweise ferner auf die Zusammensetzungen der älteren Sprache, die mit *at* (= lat. *ad*) gebildet sind. Im Gotischen erscheint *athafjan* herabheben, *athahan* herabhängen, *atssteigan* herabsteigen; im Ags. z. B. *atfleon* entfliehen, *atlaedan* fortführen, *atniman* entnehmen.

Immerhin liegen bei *at-* und *be-*, und beim lat. *ob-* die Verhältnisse entschieden anders, als bei *ent-*. Bei jenen drei Vorsilben spielt die trennende Bedeutung doch nur eine untergeordnete Rolle; bei *ent-* dagegen ist sie die herrschende geworden. Ich möchte daher glauben, dass hier die Entwicklung noch durch einen besonderen Umstand gefördert worden sei.

Die zwei indogermanischen Umstandswörter, die im Griech. *ἀνδ*, lat. *ab* einerseits und lat. *ob* andererseits vorliegen, sind im Germanischen zusammengefallen in der Bildungssilbe, die got.-alts. *af*, angels. *of* lautet. Neben Zeitwörtern nun, die die Bildungssilbe *af-* aufwiesen mit der Grundbedeutung *entgegen*, standen verwandte Verba mit der Bildungssilbe *ant-*: vgl. z. B. angels. *ofdraedan* und alts. *antdradan* fürchten, angels. *ofirnan* einholen -- got. *andrinnan* entgegenrennen, alts. *afsebbian* -- mhd. *entseben* wahrnehmen, angels. *ofseon* betrachten -- got. *andsaihwān*, angels. *onseon*, angels. *ofsettan* besetzen -- got. *andsatjan*. So hat man denn Veranlassung erhalten, auch in anderen Verwendungen den Bildungen mit *af-* solche mit *and-* zur Seite zu stellen.

Consult further W. Wilmanns's Deutsche Grammatik, 2.

Abt., "Wortbildung," 2. Aufl., 1899, pages 142-150; George O. Curme's A Grammar of the German Language, rev. and enl., 1922, pages 435-436.

CHAPTER VIII

The Meanings of in(t)-, en(t)-

Conspectus:

- I. Opposition.
- II. Approach.
- III. Ablation.
- IV. Evolution.
- V. Deprivation. a.
- VI. Deprivation. b.
- VII. Apomorphosis.
- VIII. Disqualification. a.
- IX. Disqualification. b.
 - A. Eruption.
 - B. Inchoation.

The authorities quoted in chapters VI and VII show varying degrees of agreement. On some matters there is no question; on others there is a decided lack of unity of opinion. Where it is necessary for the subject of this investigation, a decision must here be made on these debated matters.

It would be instructive to tabulate the genetic classifications of various authorities, such as Paul, Wilmanns, Seip, and Grimm, to compare them, but this work must be left to a time when this thesis may be enlarged.

The authorities agree that the original meaning of the prefix in Germanic was 'towards'. It can be shown, however, that some compounds retain the Indo-Germanic meaning 'angesichts, in the face of' (Brugmann, quoted above, page 68).

This is the sense found in the Latin quotation on page 75, "aput forum ante tribunale suum propositum habeto, quam viam...locaturus sit." The usual Latin expression is coram. (Compare Spanish ante, page 75, perhaps a redevelopment.) But as a prefix, ob- expresses the same notion. The meaning²⁷ can well be named "opposition."

27

At convenient places in the text, the title of each category will be given, the one-word mnemonic name first, and other brief data. At the end of the chapter, these rubrics will be assembled in a table.

I. Opposition.

When the compounds appropriate to this category are examined for the original meaning, it is discovered that in many the element of a personal presence is strong, especially in Gothic. This fact lends weight to the hypothesis that our prefix is derived ultimately from a noun meaning 'face.' The three Gothic verbs belonging in this category are andsitan, andhaitan, andqipan. As analyzed here, their original meanings were respectively 'sit in judgment before', 'call (avow) before witnesses', and 'speak face-to-face'. In andsitan the "presence" pertains to the subject of the verb; in andhaitan to others; in andqipan indifferently to the subject or to others. Thus and implies a presence, no matter whose. Let its spatial range be defined as follows: 'near and in the range of vision (of some one).' This range is a truncated conoid. (For the idea of nearness, compare

the Sanskrit.)

The element of personality has been weakened in Old High German. Intratan 'to feel dread before' and infindan 'experience (find) in the presence thereof' are already applicable to things which have no presences, i.e., no faces. This is due to a shift of mental focus. The meaning is merely 'opposite, before, up against.'

There are two types of verbs which, compounded with ent in the meaning Opposition permitted a permutation; each type effected a new category. First are verbs denoting motion towards or action affecting (the mental focus being with the end-point of the motion or the one affected). Second are verbs denoting motion away from (the mental focus being with the starting-point of the motion).

It is dangerous to offer equivocal cases as examples, because they may be imitations of the cases which really underwent permutation. It will be understood, therefore, that the following examples may never have been in category I. Intgeltan meant 'pay in the presence'; andsakan 'dispute in the presence, or standing before.' So intfliahan meant 'flee in the presence, flee before'; andletnan 'be let off in the presence.'

Originally the prefix gave the region of the act. But attention was not centered on the general region, which was taken for granted, but on the locus of the motion. By a

process of permutation, ent was finally apprehended as directional.

To classify the verbs of category I, Opposition:

1. With verbs not denoting motion or action affecting the thing opposite which it takes place.

(These verbs, of course, retained the meaning Opposition.)

- *2. With verbs denoting motion or action affecting the thing opposite which it takes place.

- a. Verbs denoting approach. (II.)²⁸

28

A conspectus of the mnemonic names of the categories is given for reference in lieu of an outline at the head of this chapter, with the corresponding numerization.

- b. Verbs denoting ablation. (III.)

(The asterisk marks a class which is equivocal and merges into another category. The number of the category into which the class merges is given in parentheses after the description of the class.)

An act with two terminal points must be placed in the category of Approach or of Ablation according to which point is in the focus, or, occasionally, according to which point has a presence (is personal). In intfahan the end of the motion is important (as in the simplex, fahan): one takes to oneself, into one's possession. (Possession was a concrete thing to those who could express it by besitzen 'sit con.')

Some cases, however, waver; for example, inthaben. In this word, although actual motion is not expressed, its equivalent, both physical and psychological is present.

To hold a thing against an accelerating force is equivalent to accelerating it. (The trouble is, however, that the force against which the thing is being held may be either attractive or repulsive. Inthalden in the face of an attraction is Ablation from the center of attraction; in the face of a repellant force, Approach to that center.) Now, which is the stronger or more important "personality": the storm which drives a traveler to shelter, or the person who offers him hospitality (holds him)? In other words, does the latter hold his guest away from the storm, or to himself? Of course, it really does not make much difference; it is perhaps best to put this and similar verbs in a class described as follows:

II.-III. Approach or Ablation.

This fundamental ambiguity of ent at this stage, inherent in the very origin of the 'towards' meaning, seems so obviously to explain the arising of the meaning 'away from' that it is surprising to see Paul saying (page 81): "deren Ableitung aus der Grdbd. noch nicht aufgeklärt ist." The difficulty encountered by most scholars in explaining the origin of Ablation seems to be caused by the fact that they depart from the meaning 'entgegen' without considering the meaning 'vor', which is more primitive. Thus Wilmann's explanation (Deutsche Grammatik, 2. Abt., 2. Aufl., 1899, page 143) hits at the right answer, but is cloudy.

II. Approach (literal or figurative, physical or psychological), Direction Towards or At, Return, Retention.

In the investigation at first Ablation was derived from Approach, by shift of focus. Thus entnehmen was supposed first to have come to mean 'take towards oneself' and later, the mental focus shifting from the end-terminal of the act to the starting terminal, 'take from another.' But the superfluity of supposing such a step is obvious.

Approach developes along some lines which will not be given separate numeration. One is Hostile Approach. Both Jacob Grimm (Deutsche Grammatik, 2. Theil, Scherer edition, page 798) and Dr. Elsbeth Seip (Die gotischen Verba mit dem Präfix and-, 1923, page 6) assume that Hostile Approach was the original meaning, from which mere Approach was obtained by weakening. This theory would not be suggested to one who began to trace the Germanic development from Opposition (Latin coram). If Approach arose from Hostile Approach by permutation, the pleonastic use of ent with verbs of Hostile Approach must be assumed. In the reverse permutation, no original pleonasm need be assumed; in fact, the permutation causes a pleonasm to appear.

Hostile Approach may be designated by IIα. An example (non-equivocal) is Gothic andrinnan.

Entgelten means 'pay over'; but a payment returns a benefit. The mental focus may have been shifted at one time to the element of return, and ent consequently applied to

other verbs in a sense of Return (IIβ).

III. Ablation, Direction Away From, Retention.

In the Merseburg charms we already find inspringan and invaran. During the ninth century this class was very fruitful; in the thirteenth it was still popular; and it is probably still functioning today (it is included in the Muret-Sanders dictionary, sub voce ent-). For remarks on the syntax, see the quotation from Paul, pages 81-83.

Ablation shifts into what is here called Evolution. To understand the rise of this new category, it must be understood that certain verbs denoting complicative processes were in Old High German quite ambiguous. This may be explained by reference to the case of tun in modern German. Compounded with auf it means 'open', with zu 'close'. The verb luhhan meant sometimes 'open', sometimes 'close'. In the Minnesänger we find decken meaning 'uncover'. Of course, the speakers of the language were not without recourse when it was necessary to distinguish between the two opposed meanings of these words. There were adverbs and prefixes which might be employed for that purpose. From wintan 'wind' were formed inwintan and intwintan, meaning 'wind up, involve' and 'unwind, evolve' respectively. Int- was appropriate to the latter meaning since it denoted Ablation: a thing unwound (a winding) was removed. From the Latin translation of the two words last cited, terms can be formed to

name the two types of verbs: involutionary and evolutionary.

- *1. With verbs not of undoing (evolution) or deprivation.
(+ in \rightarrow A.)²⁹

29

The plus sign denotes 'phonetic associative interference with' (see A, Eruption, below).

- *2. With verbs of undoing (evolution) or deprivation.

This use was a functional use, since the simple verb was often ambiguous: the simplex or a corresponding compound usually assumed the other meaning (doing up or involution, provision).

- a. Verbs of evolution. (IV.)
b. Verbs of deprivation (a sub-set of a). (V.)

IV. Evolution, Undoing. (In the new verbs of this class, the prefix was applied to a simplex of involution or to a word containing an affix correlative to the ent- and denoting involution, ent- in the latter case replacing the prefix.)

Psychologically belonging to this category are some verbs without any verb of involution corresponding to them yet found (the ent having been rather pleonastic than functional): thus intspenan from *spenan (M.H.G. spenen) 'wean'. (This is assuming that *spenan never meant 'give suck to', which would render intspenan an ordinary case.) So also enthaupten was probably derived from houbeten without any interference from the verb houbeten 'put at the head, make the chief.'

The presence of five verbs of evolution in Gothic (and-bindan, andbundnan, andhuljan, andwasjan, andhamon) was found at first somewhat disturbing to the supposition that Evolution was derived from Ablation, since Ablation plays

such a small part in the meaning of the prefix in Gothic. But the Gothic remains are too scanty to attribute much weight to the numerical distribution of the meanings. At any rate, it was found that any effort made to explain the independent development of Evolution from Opposition paralleled the development, Opposition to Approach and Ablation, so that the history of Evolution would be absorbed in that development.

30

Perhaps to explain the slight extension of Ablation in Gothic over against the greater extension of Evolution, one may adduce that Gothic was already provided with a prefix of Ablation (fra-, not to mention af-), whereas Evolution needed an expression. (In High German, the meaning of abe- seems to have tended to Rupture. Fra-, for some reason became unproductive.) As a last resort, we can derive Gothic's Evolution from Approach, by shift of mental focus, as suggested above for Ablation.

Two subsets of Evolution or Undoing, namely the Undoing of a Provision and the Undoing of a Qualification (Factition), gave rise to important new applications of ent, and, although they were probably not felt as distinct from Evolution, will be assigned separate categories (V and VIII).

1. Undoing not of a provision or qualification (factitive).
- *2. Undoing of a provision. (V.)
- *3. Undoing of a qualification (factitive). (VIII.)
(See note under VII.)

Some qualifications are provisions, that is, those expressed by factitive verbs based on adjectives denoting provision. Hence there is some overlapping, but the important matter is the part of speech, and undoing of a provisive-factitive

should be traced under VIII, Disqualification. a.

V. Deprivation. a (a sub-set of IV).

*1. Verbs with a nominal base. (VI.)

*2. Verbs with an adjectival base (a sub-set of VIII).

The shift of verbs of Deprivation of this type a (that is, verbs segregated from Evolution because of their special importance) to the next class was by what we might call "syntactical permutation". This may be exemplified by the phrase derring do (which, rather, illustrates in fact error): in that phrase do was formerly a verb, in fact, an infinitive. Spenser supposed it to be a noun. Thus a ratio was drawn between kraft and entkreften (in spite of the umlaut), while it should have been drawn between kreften and entkreften; the same ratio was applied to words like Larve 'mask', giving entlarven 'unmask'. (Notice the absence of umlaut, although I am not prepared to say that no ent-compounds directly from nouns were umlauted.) Verbs like entlarven will be assigned to a separate category VI, although in the national mind they are identified with those of category V.

VI. Deprivation. b.

1. With nouns used literally.

*2. With nouns used metonymically (in synecdoche). (VII.)

Some verbs do not denote the deprivation from some thing expressed in the base, but from the (essential) qualities of the thing expressed in the base. Thus entmannen does not denote 'deprive of a man, or of men', but 'deprive of the essential qualities of man, render no man.' This

seems to be effected by compounding nouns used in a synecdochic sense. Later other similar compounds were made without the mediation of a figure of speech.

VII. Apomorphosis (Defactition, with nominal base).

1. Denoting partial loss of character or nature.
2. Denoting total loss of character or nature. (May contribute to IX through the fundamental likeness of adjective and noun.)

It might be considered that here, too, there could be a preparatory stage, in which verbs of Apomorphosis were derived, instead of from nouns, from verbs of "Epimorphosis," just as verbs of Deprivation were derived from those of Provision and verbs of Disqualification (VIII) from those of Qualification. Such a verb of Epimorphosis is ermannen (Lexer: "ein man sein, werden, mut fassen"), found around the beginning of the thirteenth century. (Lexer gives a citation for entmannen only in the fourteenth century.) The derivation from Deprivation, however, seems more plausible. If it is thought desirable, in spite of all, to leave the possibility of derivation of Apomorphosis directly from Evolution open, VII may be divided into VII.a and VII.b, corresponding to V and VI respectively, or to VIII and IX.

Verbs of Deprivation and Disqualification are, as has been noticed above, merely segregated cases of verbs of Evolution, and form sub-sets of that category. No further introduction is necessary for category VIII.

*VIII. Disqualification. a (a sub-set of IV). (Some cases are V.2.) (IX, the cases identical with V.2 effecting IX.2.)

The same "syntactical permutation" which produced VI from V operated on *VIII. By the general meaning of Evolution or Undoing, verbs of Disqualification were formed on ratios similar to the following: würdigen / entwürdigen = beschuldigen / entschuldigen = ermutigen / entmutigen. Later, by syntactical permutation, the ratio was appreciated as follows: würdig / entwürdigen = schuldig / entschuldigen = mutig / entmutigen. Naturally the time was ripe for formations like blöße / entblößen.

- IX. Disqualification. b (Defactition, with adjectival base).
1. With general adjectives. (This type may contribute to VII, through the fundamental likeness of adjective and noun.)
 2. With adjectives of content or endowment (a sub-set of 1).

Adjectives of content or endowment (as mutig) produce disqualificatives which are at the same time privatives. Entmuten (VI) is equivalent to entmutigen (IX). Adjectives of the type -ig would be capable, if frequently enough compounded with ent, of leading to derivatives directly from nouns of the type ent--igen, without an intervening adjectival stage. As yet, this remains only in the realm of possibilities.

When evolutionary (privative, apomorphic, disqualificative) verbs on a nominal or adjectival basis coexist with

involutionary (provisive, epimorphotic, qualificative) verbs on the same base, it is not always possible to tell whether the evolutionary verb was formed from the involutionary verb (V, VII.a, VIII) or from the noun (VI, VII.b) or adjective (IX).

*A. Eruption, Escape. (+ in \rightarrow B.)

On page 93, after the description of the first group of verbs of Ablation, "verbs not of undoing (evolution) or deprivation," the indication "+ in \rightarrow A" was given. Thereby preparation was made for the explanation of the derivation from Ablation of the meaning Eruption.

In the ninth century, such verbs as inbrennen, inbrinnan (inprinnan), inliuhtan may be observed. These seem to correspond to Gothic compounds such as inbrannjan, inliuhtjan, transitives. (Otfrid's inbrinnan and the inprinnan of Muspilli are intransitive; inliuhtan varies.) If we interpret these as compounds with in like the Gothic verbs, subsequent forms containing int or ent must be explained as phonetic interferences: so entbrennen, entleuchten, and their analogues. This is the explanation of Paul (see page 83), and it is the explanation used in constructing the genetic table of the meanings of ent for this thesis.

But not all authorities are with Paul on this. Be-haghel (see page 83) cites several Latin compounds with ob showing inchoation (all but seven, however, have the inchoative

suffix; it is not very surprising that these denote Inchoation), and suggests a regular development of the meaning of ent from Opposition to Inchoation (a meaning related closely to that of Eruption or Excitation to Eruption, for which see B below). Behagel tried to dig up other supporting evidence for this trend, I have no doubt, but managed only to find Old Saxon answebian 'entschlafen'. Is this not the preposition an, Gothic ana 'in, etc.'?³¹

31

It may be noted here that some of Grimm's Old English examples of "ent" probably really contain West Saxon on 'in': in Deutsche Grammatik, 2. Theil, page 801, onlyhtan, ontyn-dan (onstandan?).

Wilmanns (D. Gr., 2. Abt., 2. Aufl., 1899, page 145) admits the interference of in, but suggests that some inchoatives had a regular development:

...Auch diese Bedeutung entspringt daraus, dass int- auf den Ausgangspunkt der Thätigkeit hinweist, kann also auch bei den Verben der ersten und zweiten Gruppe stattfinden, kommt aber bei ihnen weniger zur Geltung, weil das negative, aufhebende und trennende Moment überwiegt. Zum Teil aber beruhen diese Inchoativa wohl auf Compositis mit in...

Wilmanns's "negatives, aufhebendes und trennendes Moment" is what was found in ab- (foot-note 30, page 94 above) and named with Rupture. By "der ersten und zweiten Gruppe" he means practically what would be meant in this essay by "of Approach and Ablation." Wilmanns is thinking of the specialized, as it were, pregnant, Ablation involved in en-bluejen, entsinnen, entspriezen, intsten. There is not only a removal (from the source outwards), but also an

unfolding, an origin.

This pregnancy can be adequately explained as being contributed by the simplex. The common element which seems attributable to the prefix is a sudden appearance or emergence, a breaking out or Eruption. Having this as a starting-point, one will find the problem much simplified.

How does Eruption differ from Ablation? Mainly in the absence of a definite direction. But there is, nevertheless, an element of Ablation in Eruption, and this element formed the material for the operation of a phonetic associative interference (pages 44-47). The in-compounds of Eruption, transitive and intransitive, when uttered evoked two images (the sound [in] being capable of evoking Eruption or Ablation); these images fused easily; in was apprehended as a member of the in/int family, and in the dialectal wavering of the time could be replaced by int. The fusion with Ablation permitted freer formation of compounds; the eruption referred to might be less violent, and amount to mere Emergence.

Not very far removed was the meaning Escape. Words like intfliahan could already denote directional Escape or Ablation; the meaning now containing indefiniteness of direction, the Escape could be that of amorphous objects and fluids: engiezen 'overflow', modern entkochen 'cook over (and out)'. Suddenness is almost lost.

B. Inchoation, Causation.

The inchoative meaning, as in intslafan and insuebben, is closely related to Eruption. Here, too, the preposition in was the original element of the formations. It made both intransitives (the inchoatives proper) and transitives (causatives). But the greater abstractness of these words gave less in common with Ablation and less likelihood of fusion of images. In a context with an inchoative, the meaning Ablation, or any other meaning properly associated with int, would be rejected if it arose.

But once int had acquired the meaning Eruption, the more general meaning Inchoation would be associated therewith, and the inchoatives would be brought into the in/int group. (Equivocal cases were not lacking to aid this association: entflammen is 'to begin to flame (flammen)'; the causative and inchoative verbs on the base inbrenn- might easily be confused even in Old High German.)

Other instances of phonetic associative interference with ent- are too sporadic to be noticed here.

In recapitulation of this chapter, a table of the meanings, with an indication of the individual genetic relationships, may be attempted. (The table is simply a collection of the rubrics inserted through the chapter as guides.)

I. Opposition.

1. With verbs not denoting motion or action affecting the thing opposite which it takes place.
- *2. With verbs denoting motion or action affecting the thing opposite which it takes place.
 - a. Verbs denoting approach. (II.)
 - b. Verbs denoting ablation. (III.)

II.-III. Approach or Ablation.

II. Approach (literal or figurative, physical or psychological), Direction Towards or At, Return, Retention.

II α . Hostile Approach.

II β . Return.

III. Ablation, Direction Away From, Retention.

- *1. With verbs not of undoing (evolution) or deprivation. (\dagger in $\geq A$.)
- *2. With verbs of undoing (evolution) or deprivation.
This use was a functional use, since the simple verb was often ambiguous: the simplex or a corresponding compound usually assumed the other meaning (doing up or involution, provision).
 - a. Verbs of evolution. (IV.)
 - b. Verbs of deprivation (a sub-set of a). (V.)

IV. Evolution, Undoing. (In the new verbs of this class, the prefix was applied to a simplex of involution or to a word containing an affix correlative to the ent- and denoting involution, ent- in the latter case replacing the prefix.)

1. Undoing not of a provision or qualification (factitive).
- *2. Undoing of a provision. (V.)
- *3. Undoing of a qualification (factitive). (VIII.)
(See note on VII.)

V. Deprivation. a (a sub-set of IV).

- *1. Verbs with a nominal base. (VI.)
- *2. Verbs with an adjectival base (a sub-set of VIII).

VI. Deprivation. b.

1. With nouns used literally.
- *2. With nouns used metonymically (in synecdoche). (VII.)

VII. Apomorphosis (Defactition, with nominal base).

1. Denoting partial loss of character or nature.
2. Denoting total loss of character or nature. (May contribute to IX through the fundamental likeness of adjective and noun.)

*VIII. Disqualification. a (a sub-set of IV). (Some cases are V.2.) (IX, the cases identical with V.2 effecting IX.2.)

IX. Disqualification. b (Defactition, with adjectival base).
 1. With general adjectives. (May contribute to VII, through the fundamental likeness of adjective and noun.)
 2. With adjectives of content or endowment (a sub-set of 1).

A. Eruption, Escape. (+ in \supset B.)

B. Inchoation, Causation.

CHAPTER IX

Gothic and High German Examples

The principal inductive work done in the pursuit of this investigation was the collection of all examples of the prefix under consideration from certain literary monuments. An attempt was made to assign the meaning of each according to the eleven categories (see chapter VIII). The words found are in this chapter tabulated and annotated.

The following glossaries were abstracted: those of Paul Piper's Die älteste deutsche Litteratur bis um das Jahr 1050 (selections), Piper's edition of Otfrids Evangelienbuch, Eduard Sievers's edition of Tatian, Karl Bartsch's edition of Der Nibelunge nôt. G. F. Benecke's Wörterbuch zu Hartmanns Iwein was also abstracted. Further, I read to page 302, line 20, of Elias von Steinmeyer's Die kleineren althochdeutschen Sprachdenkmäler, copying all occurrences of the prefix found (and all dubious cases). A few instances have been gathered outside this reading.

The notes which follow the tables are grouped by categories. Longer notes will be required on the Gothic examples and on the earlier, no longer active, categories than on the others.

In the tables, the sources are indicated after each word, the names sometimes being abbreviated after the first

mention. The examples in each century which could not be classified or interpreted at all are given at the end of each table.

Fourth Century (Gothic)

- I. andhaitan
 andqipān
 andsitan
- II. andrinnan
 andhafjan
 andsāljan
 andspeiwan
 andstaldan
 andtilon
 andniman
 andbeitan
 andhausjan
 andhruskan?
 andsaiban
 andsakan
 andstandan
 andstaurran
 andþag(g)kjan
 andwaihan
 andwaurdjan
- III. andletnan
- IV. andbindan
 andbundnan
 andhamon
 andhuljan
 andwasjon

Sixth Century (Gothic)

andniman? (Naples Papyrus)

Eighth Century and Before

- II. intfahan, infahan (Weissenburg Catechism), inphahan
 (Sankt Gall Paternoster), antfahan (Isidor);
 infancnissa (Isidor)
- III. inspringan (Merseburg Charms)
 invaran (Merseburg Charms)

Ninth Century

- I. infualen (Otfrid)
 inseffen (O.)
 intstantan (O.)
 intratan (O., Tatian)
- II.-III. inthaben (Otfrid, Rule of the Benedictines); int-
 habanii (R.B., II?)
- II. intgeltan (O.), ingeldan (Rithmus...de...Hluduico rege)
 inthelden (T.)
 intlihan;(inliheri (T.)
 intfahan (O., T. R.B., Freising Paternoster A, Exhorta-
 tio ad plebem christianam A, B; to be supplied but
 hardly read in Muspilli 72), intphahan (T.), ent-
 fahan (R.B.), antfahan (R.B.), intfaan (Augsburg
 Prayer), infahan (O., Freisinger Paternoster B, T.),
 inphahan (T.)
 intfrahan (R.B.)
 intneinen (O.)
 inquedan (O.)
- III. inbizan (O.), inpizan (Basle receipts), inbizzan (R.B.);
 imbiz (R.B.)
 inkliaban (O.)
 intlazan (T.)
 intuuerfan (O.)
 intuuirken (O.)
 inziahan (O.)
 intfallan (O.)
 intfliahan (O.)
 intgangen (O.), ingangan (O., T.), ingan (O.)
 intsizzan (O.)
 inslichen (O.)
 intslupfen (O.)
 instrichan (O.)
 intuaren (O.)
 intuuichan (O.)
 entrahon (R.B.)
 intredinon (O.)
 insalzan (O.)
 inzellan (O.)
intuuenan (Old Alemannic Psalm CXXX, perhaps intspenan)
- IV. inbintan (O., R.B.), intbindan (Augsburg Prayer), int-
 pindan (Murbach Hymns)
 intdecchan (R.B.), intheken (O.), inthecken (T.)
 intheizan (O.)
 intluhhan (R.B., Old Alemannic Psalm CVIII)
 intrihan (R.B., T.)
 intsezzan (R.B.)
 insliazan (O.)
 intuon, induon (T.), induan (O.)

V.-VI. interen (O., T.)
 inklenken (O.)
 innagalen (O.)
 intspenan (R.B., perhaps rather than intuuenan in Old
 Alemannic Psalm CXXX)
 insperren (O.)
 intuiton (R.B.), intuiten (T.), intvaton (R.B.)

A. inliuhten (O., T.)
 inbrennen (T.), inbrinnan (O.), inprinnan (Muspilli)
 inbrestan (Ol)

B. inginnan (T.)
 inkennen (T.)
 incnahan (T.)
 intslafan (T.)
 insuebben (O.)

Doubtful examples:

intberan (O.) (in 'not')
 inblantan 'auferlegen' (O.)
 imbot 'Auftrag' (O.)
 inthihan 'beginnen' (O.)
 inkan (-ingan) (R.B.) (II? 'ingreditur')
 inkan 'hassen, anklagen' (O.)
 inkinnen 'inponant' (R.B.)
 invaldan 'revolvere' (in?)

Tenth Century

- I. infīndan (Notker Labeo)
enchēdan (N.L.)
 - II. intfahan (De heinrico) (MS. intsiegina = intfieg ina),
infâhan, enfâhan (N.L.); infângare (N.L.)
 - III. infāllan (N.L.)
infāran (N.L.)
ingīnnan (N.L.)
intrinnen (Psalm CXXXVIII)
imbizs (Lay of St. George)
 - A. inzūndan (N.L.)
 - B. inslâfan (N.L.)
- Doubtful examples:
indânôt 'entledigt' (N.L.)

Eleventh Century

- II. inphahen (Notker of Vienna's Sermons B), imfahen (N.V. S. A), imphahen (Otloh's Prayer), ...phahen (N.V. S. C)
 intheizen (N.V.S. A)
- III. inziehen (N.V.S. B)
 imfliehen (N.V.S. A)
intwerdung (N.V. Wessobrunn Confession), intuerdung (N.V. Bamberg Confession)
 intsagen (N.V. First Wessobrunn Credo)
- IV. inblândini (N.V. Bamberg Conf.), inblandini (N.V.W.C.)
Ituindun (De definitione)
- A. intliuhten (N.V.S. B), inliuhten (Otloh's Prayer),
 inlviden (Older Physiologus)
 entluhten (Older Phys.) (weak verb: entlvhtet; interference of intluhhan and intliuhtan?)
 inzunden (N.V. Spiritual Council)
- B. inslâfen (Older Phys.)
- Doubtful examples:
 antderon 'imitate' (?) (Older Phys.)
 intlouh 'released' (N.V.S. B)
 Intrerteda 'Intemperies' (St. Gall school-work)
 emp... (N.V.S. C)

Twelfth Century

- III. enlazen (Lay of Roland)

Thirteenth Century

- I. enpfinden (Der Nibelunge Nôt, Iwein)
- II. enbiuten (I.), enbieten (N.N.)
 engelten (I., N.N.), engelden (N.N.)
 entlihen (I.)
 entwerfen (N.N.)
 enpfahen (I., N.N.), enpfan (N.N.)
 entnemen (I.)
 enthalden (N.N.)
 entmuoten (Wolfram von Eschenbach's Parzival)
 emphelhen (N.N.)
- III. enbizzen (I., N.N.)
 enpfüeren (N.N.)
 enthalten (I.), enthalden (N.N.)
 entweren (I.)
 engan (N.N.)
 enpfallen (I., N.N.)
 entrinnen (I., N.N.)
 entsitzen (I.)
 entwichen (I., N.N.)
 entsagen (I.)
 entwelen (I.)
 entwenken (I.)
- IV. embinden (N.N.)
 enblanden (I.)
 entgesten (N.N.)
 entladen (N.N.)
 entrichten (N.N.)
 entrüsten (N.N.)
 en(t)sliezen (N.N.)
 entwürken (I.)
- V.-VI. enterben (I.)
 enteren (I.)
 ensperren (I.)
 entwafenen (I., N.N.)
- A. enzünden (N.N.)
 enbrinnen (N.N.)
 engiezen (N.N.)
- B. entslafen (I., N.N.)
 entsweben (N.N.)
- Doubtful examples:
 enbern (N.N.) (en 'not')

Notes

I. Opposition.

andhaitan: Original meaning, 'to call...in (some one's) presence'. The presence was of necessity a significant one; here it was the presence of witnesses before whom the calling (avowal) was important. Original construction probably accusative of the named and instrumental or vocative of the name. (This from a priori considerations, but confirmed by Delbrück, Synkretismus, 1907, page 41.) Romans 10.9 fraujin Iesu. 1 Tim. 6.12 andhaihaist pamma godin andhaita 'called by the good calling.' Mark 1.5 andhaitandans frawaurhtim seinaim 'calling (their deeds) their sins', calling a spade a spade, that is, acknowledging their sins; all these imply 'before witnesses.' Naturally the word underwent shift of mental focus, until the instrumentality of the dative complement was lost. Ellipsis of the accusative would cause confusion of the name with the named: Matt. 10.32 andhaitip mis 'acknowledged me.' Is the meaning 'praise' borrowed from the Greek verb?

andqipan: 'speak...in his presence'. Luke 8.19 atid-djedun pan du imma aipei jah brobrjus is jah ni mahtedun andqipan imma faura managein 'there came, then, to him his mother and brothers and could not interview him in view of the crowd.' That is, they could not have an audience with him, sit down before him; he was an important personage (had a "presence") and would "receive" them. Or perhaps andqipan implies merely a personal conversation, face to face, differing from speaking to a group. But 'interview' is given in the lexicon for συντυχάνω. Luke 9.61 is puzzling: ip faupis uslaubei mis andqipan paim paiei sind in garda meinamma 'but first give me leave to say good-bye to them that are in my house.' This might be Ablation, 'say oneself away' (like our bow oneself out). More probably, the young man's leave-taking was an intimate (face-to-face) speaking. Was this the situation which leave-taking implied generally to the Goth? The Greek implies 'arrange (to get) oneself off.' Was this in Wulfila's mind?

andsitan: 'sit opposite.' The regular construction, I believe, is the dative, 'sit opposite to a thing' (Skeireins 8.10, Streitberg ed., unselein). Galatians 2.6 (A) andwairpi accusative from the Greek. 1 Cor. 10.27 waiht adverbial. One sat opposite in order to look at: andsailwan. Either of these concrete verbs could describe the mental activity (permutation), 'consider, enquire.' Do not enquire about the food (1 Cor. 10.27); the meaning has been adequated somewhat. Jesus paid no attention to their

wickedness (Sk. 8.10); here is adequation in another direction. Compare our dialectal "Ha'nts? I ain't studyin' no ha'nts." Would this be a connection of the Gothic with Otfrid's intsizzen? That which one ignores, one does not fear. Gal. 2.6 (A) gub mans andwairbi ni andsitip 'God does not consider (take into consideration) a man's person (station, appearance?)'.

in(t)fualen, inseffen, infindan: This may be called the perception group. I have put it under Opposition on the basis of the following interpretation: a thing must be presented to the sense-organs before it is perceived. In the presence of light, one perceives light. In the presence of fire, one perceives heat. The thing perceived comes before one, and one 'feels,' 'tastes,' or 'finds' it. If, however, the Latin percipere gives a clue to the folk-psychology involved, this may be ranged with intfahan under Approach. Otfrid 3.14.35 ih infualta thaz etthesuuer mih ruarta 'I took in the feeling (or received--cipio again) that somebody moved me.'

intstantan: 'stand before or opposite something.' For Opposition in this word we have the analogy of verstehen itself (Kluge sub voce). One stands before a thing "um es genau zu erkennen," that is, to understand it. Perhaps, however, 'understand intellectually' was derived from 'understand sensually'. Thus I see came to mean 'I understand.' To catch another's words, one would stand face-to-face with him. Or, in a situation in which two were communicating across a wide stream, the best conditions for understanding would be when the men were opposite one another on the banks. M.H.G. compare Der gute Gerhard 3114.

intratan: The simplex of this verb is not found in any Germanic language, but it probably was similar in meaning to our dread. I interpret 'feel dread in the presence.' This is, however, a good case for permutation to (psychological) Direction At.

enchedan: 'standing opposite each other, to speak.' Notker Labeo de musica 5 Sîd tû nû bechénnêst . uûio âlle die suégelâ einânderên enchedên 'since thou now knowest how all the flutes correspond to one another.' The idea for using cheden may have come to Notker from the Latin word correspondere. Or do the flutes make noise (speak) face to face?

II.-III. Approach or Ablation.

inhaben: 'hold to something or away.' Otfrid 1.14.13 sih innan thes inthabeti, in themo gotes hus ni betoti

'meanwhile she kept herself in (back, away?), nor prayed in the church.' Where is the focus in the inthaben: at the place where (unexpressed) or the place from which?

II. Approach.

andhafjan: 'to heave...at some one.' This figure is natural for answering; compare our keep the ball (sc. of conversation) rolling. The thing heaved was an andawaurdi or an andahafts. But since in the situation of answering, a return is made, this word, if not modeled on similar expressions which had already gone permutation, is capable of developing by permutation the meaning Return, a specialization of Approach.

andhausjan, andsaihan, andpag(g)kjan: A group of directed mental or sensory activity. Hausjan and andhausjan are contrasted in Mark 6.20 jah hausjands imma manag gata-wida jah gabaurjaba imma andhausida 'and hearing him did much and gladly hearkened to him.' Directed hearing demands attentive hearing; attentive hearing promises obedience. So hearken in English. Luke 17.6 obedience is clear. In John 9.31 we have the attentive hearing of a deity: we speak of hearing prayer and imply therein the answer.

andbeitan: 'bite at.' Used figuratively for bitter reproach, it lost figure by evanition; then used hyperbolically, it was quotidiated to denote general reproach, such as might be said of Christ. (Surely Wulfila did not conceive of Christ as having a cross temper.) 2 Cor. 4.8 andbitanai, akei ni afslauþidai 'embarrassed (?)', but not put to despair.' Andbeitan may have become 'annoy, harrass' by the following process: It was said of dogs, who bit at the passers in Gothic communities. The mental focus became shifted from the action of the dog's mouth to the entire effect which the dog had on the person snapped at. The word then meant 'annoy', and could be used of anything annoying. Or does the passage imply 'oppressed, as by obloquy and re-crimination'?

intheizen (page 109): 'promise' (?). I assume that heizen had the meaning 'promise' alone; the int infers the direction of a promise to some one. (Steinmeyer, page 157.)

entwerfen: 'depict,' original meaning 'throw on to'. Nib. nöt 286.2 sam er entworfen wære an ein permint. The accusative with an confirms the belief that direction is here involved, though the primary meaning of the verb would leave little doubt.

III. Ablation.

andletnan: 'be let off.' Ph. 1.23 the word is a euphemism for 'die'. I range it alone among Gothic compounds under Ablation, since the end-point of death (heaven?) was

probably not in the focus. If we consider, however, that the word is a euphemism and borrowed from other situations, this point may lose importance: the original meaning could have been 'be let towards,' shift of focus would have produced 'depart,' which could then, of course, be used for 'die.'

inbizan: 'bite away.' This verb looks like a compound of the preposition in, but Behaghel's citation of Old Saxon andbitan makes us look to ent. (See above, page 84.) The main question is then whether Approach or Ablation. Approach seems out of the question, for the biting takes place after the morsel is in the mouth: it can approach no nearer. On the other hand, one bites the morsel away from the viand in question; one even removes a meal from the table with bites. If this is so, the word has undergone considerable adequation by the time of the Basle receipts, meaning simply 'partake of,' whether solids or liquids: ni des uuazares nenpize and ni cullantres niinpiize ni des eies. Here, as in Otfrid, the partitive genitive is used: bite from the bread, eat some of the bread, manger du pain. Ezzan takes the acc.; when the thing named in the complement is all eaten, ezzan; when but part, inbizan. In the Rule of the Benedictines, imbiz or inbiz is 'refectio', inbizzen 'reficere.' This is specialization due to adequation; our monks spoke of going to take a little bite; quotidiatio followed.

CHAPTER X

Conclusions

A general review of the results of the present investigation is here in order.

The type of meaning-change most frequently observed in the semasiological history of ent is permutation. This type of change is discussed on pages 54 and 55. Its effects are the redistribution of semantic contribution among the elements of a "complex" (expression apprehended as consisting of more than one semantic contributor). When ent was compounded with a verb or set of verbs having a general, easily abstracted element of meaning (as approach, ablation, hostility), that element was often apprehended as being expressed by ent.

The semasiological history of affixes present some peculiarities not observable in the semasiological history of independent words. First, although changes of meaning must first occur through regular processes in particular verbs, no new and distinct meaning is assigned to the affix until that meaning has been used in the analogical formation of new verbs. Sometimes it may be doubtful whether any of the examples are analogical, in which case it is also doubtful whether a new meaning (one which the affix can "use") is involved.

Again, it is apparent that an expression which depends for its change of meaning upon changes in whole groups of words is less liable to intentional changes than expressions not so dependent. Certainly such changes would be slower to manifest themselves in the meaning of an affix.

It has seemed to me that an interesting and perhaps effective way to present a summary of the semasiological history of our prefix would be to assume, for a moment, the hypothesis that the present research had been instituted in order to prepare an article on ent for a "semasiological dictionary." The summary would be the article itself, of necessity condensed, yet easy to follow, using all the devices of typography, abbreviation, and symbolism at the disposal of the lexicographer.

The hypothetical dictionary will differ little from the ordinary dictionary of the type of Webster's New International Dictionary, except that the genetic relation between the various meanings will be specifically indicated, and that meanings are stressed even in the etymology.

The order of data will be as follows: (1) head-word; (2) pronunciation; (3) grammatical description; (4) etymology; (5) historical morphology; (6) semasiology: (a) process involved in the origin; (b) words equivalent to the meaning (or definition); (c) citations.

Some of my unusual ideas of lexicography call for explanations. Words are cited in the orthography of the

manuscripts. For consistency's sake, no transliteration has been employed. (The traditional usage which permits the retention of the Greek, but of no other extra-Roman, alphabet is clearly inconsistent, hence vicious.) However, the pronunciation, as well as it can be reconstructed, is transcribed. The system of transcription employed is eclectic, but need not be described here, beyond explaining that upright marks (! and ,) denote stress (respectively, principal and secondary), as the system proposed by the conference at Copenhagen provided. Such a symbol crossed or canceled by another mark denotes (relative) lack of stress.

The phrasing of the definitions requires some explanation. The ideal was to give in each case an English expression actually interchangeable with the element ent or ³²ent...en. Thus, infindan is defined as 'find...in his presence'

³²Ent...en signifies the derivation of a verb through ent from a non-verb, in which case, of course, the infinitival ending is necessary to mark the metamorphosis.

iz [hónag] sínero sûezi îeht infínde would mean 'finds aught of its sweetness in its (namely, the sweetness's) presence.' The definition 'find in the presence of...' would have been improper, since the regimen of infindan is from findan, not from in(t). There would be a question, "Find what?"

I have selected citations for earliness and significance; in an actual dictionary they would be much augmented.

ent [rent > rant] inseparable verbal prefix [Ideur. *ánta, *ánti 'before, in the presence of' (? obl. cases of a noun 'countenance, face' or ?< *an + ta, *an + ti, as Gr. πρὸς [protí] and κᾶτα [káta]: Brugmann). *ánta formally underlies the Goth. prep. ANNA ['anda], but the meaning has developed 'along, (to a position) over, on(to)' (?by interference from a similar but etym. distinct prep.). *ánda or *ándi in Gmc. had the original meaning, as is evidenced by the compounds. (No sign of *ándi unless in and; but see next on stress.) On the rise of the dynamic accent (stress), the stress-pattern of the verbal compounds became *,anda'~ (?*,andi'~). Under these conditions the unstressed vowel a (?i) fell out.] In the High Germ. regions the vbl. comps., now inseparable, took the form int, assim. by stops to in. There are many variations (see Grimm D.G. (Sch.) 2.797f). M.H.G. stress-obscuration brought about ent, en. f assim. the pref., entf or enf yielding enph, enpf (see Armitage Intr. §197) [(entpf >) enpf > enmf > emf]. In mod. times en and most cases of enp have been replaced by ent analogically. For phonetic interference giving rise to ent, see, besides 10 and 11 below, entbehren, entgegen, entgegenen, entzwei.

1. [comp. with verbs] in the presence or face (of the person or thing concerned), before him (her, it, them, etc.).

9. OTFRID intratan 'dread...in his (its) presence, fear'; intstantan 'stand before' (transitive) > [perfectivization] 'recognize, understand.' 10. NOTKER infindan 'find...in its

presence, perceive (as feel, taste)', modern empfinden 'feel'.

2. [permutation of 1 in comp. with verbs of motion or effect in which the end-point is in the focus; e.g., intgeltan 'pay for in the presence > pay over for in the presence > pay over for'; intfahan 'take in one's presence > take to one's presence (> self) > take over'] towards, in the direction of, at the person or thing concerned; over.

8. WEISZENBURG CATECHISM intfahan 'take to oneself', mod. empfangen 'receive, take'. 9. TATIAN inthelden 'lean towards something > droop'.

2β. [perm. of 2 in comp. with verbs denoting a reciprocation or return] back.

9. OTFRID intgeltan 'pay back for', mod. entgelten 'atone, suffer for'.

3. [perm. of 1 in comp. with verbs of motion in which the starting-point is in the focus; e.g., intfliohan 'flee ... before him (in his presence) > flee...away before him > flee away (from him)'; intziohan 'draw in some one's presence > draw away in some one's presence > draw away'] away.

8. MERSEBURG CHARM invaran 'get (fare) away', mod. entfahen 'escape'. 9. OTFRID intfliahan 'flee away', mod. entfliehen 'flee, escape'; inkliaban 'chop (cleave) away' (showing possibility of development by perm. to expression of rupture: 'off'); intuuirken 'effect (the removal^{of}) away'; intredinon 'talk (trans.) away (> out)'.

4. [perm. of 3 in comp. with verbs of undoing; e.g., intspanan 'wean away > wean'. Since such verbs (as luhhan '(un)lock') were often ambig., denoting either doing up or

undoing, the proportion "ent / no affix, or be, er, etc. = undoing / doing up" became regular in this meaning; e.g. intluhhan 'work away with a lock → unlock, open'] un-, dis-, in reverse, not...but rather do the reverse.

9. RULE OF THE BENEDICTINES intluhhan 'unlock, open'; OTFRID intheken 'uncover', mod. entdecken [evanition of metaphor] 'discover'. 11. DE DEFINITIONE ftuindun [intwinden] 'unwind'.

5. [4 in comp. with verbs of deprivation; e.g., entkreften 'deprive of strength, unstrengthen'] un-, dis-, in reverse, not...but rather deprive of it (them).

9. OTFRID interen 'dishonor', mod. entehren; innagalen 'un-nail'.

6. ent...en [comp. with nouns, syntactical perm. of 5, the proportion becoming "ent + noun base + en / noun = 'deprive of a thing' / 'thing'"; e.g. interen 'dishonor (/ eren) → deprive of honor (/ ere)'] deprive of, de-, un-.

14. JEROSCHIN entwurzeln 'deracinate'. 18. HAGEDORN entlarven 'unmask'.

7. [evanition and quotidiation from instances of 6 used in a metonymy (in partic., a synecdoche); e.g. entmannen 'deprive of (the) man (i.e., characteristics essential to manliness) → deprive of the characteristics essential to (being) a man'. Perh. contributed to by 9; comp. ratio "er ist deutsch / er ist ein Deutscher" and entdeutschen (7 or 9?)] deprive of the characteristics essential to (being), deprive of ...ishness, render no ..., de...icize.

14. JEROSCHIN entmannen 'emasculate'. 16. LUTHER entmönchen 'render no monk, unmonk', mod. entmönchen.

8. ent [4 in comp. with verbs of disqualification (defactition on an adjectival base); e.g. entreinen 'render

unclean, soil, sully' (reinen 'clean')] un-, dis-, in reverse, not...but rather render not so.

13. MAI UND BEAFLOR entreinen 'soil, sully'.

9. ent...en [comp. with adjectives, syn. perm. of 8, the prop. being "ent + adjective base + en / adjective = 'render not so' / 'so'; e.g. entreinen 'soil, sully (/ reinen) → render not clean (/ rein)'; perh. contributed to by 7 q.v.] render not..., de...ize, de...ify, un..., un...en, etc.

18. GLEIM entblöden 'render not timid, embolden'.

10. ent [orig. in 'in' comp. with verbs of eruption or excitation to eruption, by phon. assoc. int. of ent 3, first with the intrans.; e.g. inbrinnan 'catch fire' + 'away' → 'burst (out) into flame' → intbrinnan; later by formal analogy inbrennen 'cause to catch fire, set afire' → intbrennen] eruptively, out; [by focus-shift or quotidiation of a hyperbole; e.g. entkeimen 'burst into buds → bud suddenly'] suddenly.

11. NOTKER OF VIENNA intliuchten 'shine out; illuminate', mod. entleuchten.

11. [by formal analogy, the whole semi-inchoative in-family being associated to the int-family through 10; aided by permutation from verbs with meaning 10 which were inchoative; e.g. inbrinnan 'catch fire' / inslafan 'go to sleep' = intbrinnan / intslafan] begin to; [so for verbs which were causative; e.g. inbrennen / inswebben = intbrennen / intwebben, causation shifting at one stage of the history by

perm. from verb to pref.] cause to.

9. TATIAN intslafan 'fall asleep', mod. entschlafen; OTFRID
intsuebben 'put to sleep'.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Herein are included all works consulted, except standard works of reference to which only trivial reference was made.

Dictionaries.

- Boisacq, Émile: Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque étudiée dans ses rapports avec les autres langues indo-européennes. 2^e éd. Heidelberg, C. Winter; Paris, C. Klincksieck, 1923.
- Bosworth, Joseph: An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary. Ed. and enl. by T. Northcote Toller. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1882ff.
- Donnegan, James: A New Greek and English Lexicon. 1st American, from the 2d London ed., rev. and enl. by R. B. Patton. Philadelphia, E. H. Butler & Co., 1847.
- Feist, Sigmund: Etymologisches Wörterbuch der gotischen Sprache, mit Einschluss des Krimgotischen und sonstiger gotischer Sprachreste. 2., gänzlich Neubearb. Aufl. Halle (Saale), M. Niemeyer, 1923.
- Fick, August: Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Indogermanischen Sprachen. 4. Aufl., bearb. von Adalb. Bezzenger, Aug. Fick und Whitley Stokes. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1890ff: Erster Theil. Wortschatz der Grundsprache, der Arischen und der Westeuropäischen Spracheinheit von August Fick.--Dritter Teil. Wortschatz der Germanischen Spracheinheit, unter Mitwirkung von Hjalmar Falk gänzlich umgearbeitet von Alf Torp.
- Graff, E. G: Althochdeutscher Sprachschatz, oder Wörterbuch der althochdeutschen Sprache. Berlin, beim Verfasser und in Commission der Nikolaischen Buchhandlung, 1834ff.
- Grimm, Jacob, and Grimm, Wilhelm: Deutsches Wörterbuch. Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1854ff.
- Harpers' Latin Dictionary. A new Latin Dictionary Founded on the Translation of Freund's Latin-German Lexicon, ed. by E. A. Andrews. Rev., enl., and in great part rewritten by Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short. New York [etc.], American Book Company, [c1907].
- Holthausen, F: Altenglisches etymologisches Wörterbuch. Heidelberg, C. Winter, 1934. (Germanische Bibliothek. I.IV.7.)

- Kluge, Friedrich: Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. 11. Aufl. Mit Unterstützung durch Wolfgang Krause bearb. von Alfred Götze. Berlin, Leipzig, W. de Gruyter & Co., 1934.
- Kurschat, Friedrich: Wörterbuch der litauischen Sprache. 2. Theil: Litauisch-deutsches Wörterbuch. Halle a. S., Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1883.
- Liddell, Henry George, and Scott, Robert, comp.: A Greek-English Lexicon. 8th ed., rev. throughout. New York [etc.], American Book Company, [c1882].
- Lindemann, Hermann: Taschenwörterbuch der englischen und deutschen Sprache. 11. rev. Aufl. Berlin-Schöneberg, Langenscheidtsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, [c1911].
- Loewe, Richard: Deutsches etymologisches Wörterbuch. 2., umgearb. und verm. Aufl. Berlin, Leipzig, W. de Gruyter & Co., 1930. (Sammlung Göschen. 64.)
- Monier-Williams, Sir Monier: A Sanskrit-English Dictionary Etymologically and Philologically Arranged with Special Reference to Cognate Indo-European Languages. New ed., greatly enl. and improved with the collaboration of Professor E. Leumann, Professor C. Cappeller, and other scholars. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1899.
- Lexer, Matthias: Mittelhochdeutsches Handwörterbuch. Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1872ff. 3 v.
- Murray, Sir James: The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles. Prepared by William Little, H. W. Fowler, J. Coulson. Rev. and ed. by C. T. Onions. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933. 2 v.
- Paul, Hermann: Deutsches Wörterbuch. 2. verm. Aufl. Halle a. S., M. Niemeyer, 1908.
- Priese, Oskar: Deutsch-gotisches Wörterbuch, nebst einem Anhang. 3. Aufl. Halle a. S., M. Niemeyer, 1933.
- Schade, Oskar: Altdeutsches Wörterbuch. 2. umgearb. und verm. Aufl. Halle a. S., Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1872-1882. 2 v.
- Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, editus auctoritate et consilio academiarum quinque Germanicarum, Berolinensis, Göttingensis, Lipsiensis, Monacensis, Vindobonensis. Lipsiae, B. G. Teubner, 1900ff.
- Walde, Alois: Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch. 3. neu bearb. Aufl. von J. B. Hofmann, 1930ff.
- Weigand, Fr. L. K.: Deutsches Wörterbuch. 5. Aufl. ... Gießen, A. Töpelmann, 1909.
- Muret, Eduard, and Sanders, Daniel H.: Muret-Sanders Encyclopaedic English-German and German-English Dictionary. Berlin-Schöneberg, Langenscheidtsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, n.d. 4 v.

General Linguistic Works.

- Armitage, Lionel: An Introduction to the Study of Old High German. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911.
- Brugmann, Karl, and Delbrück, Berthold: Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen. 2. Bearb. Strassburg, K. J. Trübner, 1897ff: Zweiter Band. Lehre von den Wortformen und ihrem Gebrauch. Zweiter Teil.
- Delbrück, Berthold: Synkretismus, ein Beitrag zur germanischen Kasuslehre. Strassburg, K. J. Trübner, 1907.
- Grimm, Jacob: Deutsche Grammatik. Neuer verm. Abdruck, besorgt durch Wilhelm Scherer. Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann, 1870ff. 4 v.
- Heinsen, J. C.: Mir oder Mich, Sie oder Ihnen? Dativ oder Accusativ? 6. Aufl. Hamburg, B. S. Berendsohn, n.d.
- Hirt, Hermann: Handbuch des Urgermanischen. Heidelberg, C. Winter, 1931ff. (Indogermanische Bibliothek. I.I.21.)
- Kurschat, Friedrich: Grammatik der litauischen Sprache. Halle, Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1876.
- Seip, Elsbeth: Die gotischen Verba mit dem Präfix and-. Giessen, von Münchow, 1923. (Giessener Beiträge zur Deutschen Philologie, hrsg. von O. Behaghel. X.)
- Streitberg, Wilhelm: Die gotische Bibel. 2. Teil, Gotisch-griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch. 2. Aufl. Heidelberg, C. Winter, 1928.
- Streitberg, Wilhelm: Gotisches Elementarbuch. 5. und 6. neubearb. Aufl. Heidelberg, C. Winter, 1920. (Germ. B. I.I.2.)
- Wilmanns, W.: Deutsche Grammatik, Gotisch, Alt-, Mittel- und Neuhochdeutsch. 2. Aufl. Strassburg, K. J. Trübner, 1899.
- Wright, Joseph: Grammar of the Gothic Language. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924.
- Behaghel, Otto: "Zur Lehre von der deutschen Wortbildung." In: Wissenschaftliche Beihefte zur Zeitschrift des allgemeinen deutschen Sprachvereins. 3. Reihe (Heft 11-20). Berlin, Verlag des allgemeinen deutschen Sprachvereins, 1896-1901, pages 144-145.

Semasiological Works.

- Fröhlich, Armin: "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Bedeutungslehre." In: Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde. Leipzig, Berlin, B. G. Teubner. 1926, pages 323-338. ←
- Ogden, Charles Kay, and Richards, Ivor Armstrong: The Meaning of Meaning; a Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.; New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1923. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.)

- Richter, Elise: "Die Rolle der Semantik in der historischen Grammatik." In: Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift. 2. Jahrgang, 1910. Heidelberg, C. Winter. Pages 231-243.
- Stern, Gustaf: Meaning and Change of Meaning, with Special Reference to the English Language. Göteborg, Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1931. (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift. 38, 1932:1.)
- Stern, Gustaf: Swift, Swiftly, and Their Synonyms, a Contribution to Semantic Analysis and Theory. Göteborg, Wettergren & Kerber, 1921. (Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift. 1921, 3.)
- Stöcklein, Joh.: Bedeutungswandel der Wörter, seine Entstehung und Entwicklung; ein Versuch. München, J. Lindauersche Buchhandlung (Schöpping), 1898.
- Waag, Albert: Bedeutungsentwicklung unseres Wortschatzes, ein Blick in das Seelenleben der Wörter. 3. verm. Aufl. Lehr i. B., M. Schauenburg, 1915.

Literary Monuments and Glossaries.

- Bible. N. T. English. 1611: The New Testament of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ: Translated out of the Original Greek; and with the Former Translations Diligently Compared and Revised, by His Majesty's Special Command. Appointed to be Read in Churches. London, British and Foreign Bible Society, 1924. (Combined with: Das Neue Testament unsers Herrn und Heilandes Jesu Christi, nach der deutschen Übersetzung D. Martin Luthers. Durchgesehene Ausgabe mit dem von der deutschen evangelischen Kirchenkonferenz genehmigten Text. Berlin, Britische und Ausländische Bibelgesellschaft, 1924.)
- Bible. English. 1926 (Moffatt): The Holy Bible, Containing the Old and New Testaments. A New Translation by James Moffatt. Garden City, New York, Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., [1926].
- Bible. N. T. Gothic: Die gotische Bibel, hrsg. von Wilhelm Streitberg. 2. Aufl. Heidelberg, C. Winter, 1919, 1928. (Germanische Bibliothek. II.3.)
- Bible. N. T. Greek: Griechisches Neues Testament: Text mit kurzem Apparat (Handausgabe) von Hermann Freiherr von Soden. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913.
- Bible. N. T. Latin: Nouum Testamentum Latine Secundum Editionem Sancti Hieronymi Ad Codicum Manuscriptorum Fidem Recensuerunt Iohannes Wordsworth et Henricus Iulianus White. Editio Minor Curante Henrico I. White. Oxonii, E Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1926.
- Goedeke, Karl: Grundriss zur Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung, aus den Quellen. 2. ganz neu bearb. Aufl. Erster Band, Das Mittelalter. Dresden, Ls. Ehlermann, 1884.
- Benecke, G. F.: Wörterbuch zu Hartmanns Iwein. 3. Ausg., besorgt von C. Borchling. Leipzig, Dieterich (Theodor Weicher), 1901.

- Nibelungen Lied: Der Nibelunge nôt, mit den Abweichungen von Der Nibelunge liet, den Lesarten sämtlicher Handschriften und einem Wörterbuche hrsg. von Karl Bartsch. Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1870ff. 2 pts. in 3.
- Otfrid: Otfrids Evangelienbuch. Mit Einleitung, erklärenden Anmerkungen und ausführlichem Glossar hrsg. von Paul Piper. 2., durch Nachträge erweiterte Ausg. Freiburg i. B., Tübingen, Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1882. 2 v.
- Piper, Paul: Das älteste deutsche Litteratur bis um das Jahr 1050. Stuttgart, Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, n.d. (Deutsche National-Litteratur. 1.)
- Steinmeyer, Elias von, ed.: Die kleineren althochdeutschen Sprachdenkmäler. Berlin, Weidmann, 1916.
- Tatian: Tatian. Lateinisch und altdeutsch, mit ausführlichem Glossar hrsg. von Eduard Sievers. Paderborn, F. Schöningh, 1872.
- Könnecke, Gustav: Bilderatlas zur Geschichte der deutschen Nationallitteratur. 2. verb. und verm. Aufl. Marburg, N. G. Elwert, 1912.